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GAUGING THE COST OF LOOPHOLES: HEALTH CARE
PRICING AND MEDICARE REGULATION IN THE
POST-ENRON ERA
Elizabeth A. Weeks*
I. INTRODUCTION
Tax loopholes are an accepted, almost sacred part of
government taxation. Rational taxpayers seek to minimize the
amount that they owe to the government by learning the intricacies
of the tax code, including the loopholes.! Complex regulatory
programs, such as Medicare, Medicaid, and other public benefits
programs similarly are characterized by intricate regulations
inevitably containing loopholes that program participants may use
to their advantage.2 As a matter of individual wealth or profit
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Kansas. Columbia
University, B.A.; University of Georgia, J.D. The author acknowledges the
invaluable comments of Richard Nagareda, Christopher Drahozal, Michael
Wells, Dwight Lee, Gary Eiland, Ellen Sward, and Stephen Ware and
outstanding research assistance by Kristiane Gray.
1. See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, The Loophole Artist, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Dec. 21, 2003, at 18 (discussing Jonathan Blattmachr, a partner at Milbank,
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, whose career is built on finding tax code loopholes);
Allan Sloan, Tax Tricks: No Matter How Many Tax Loopholes Get Closed,
Corporate America Always Seem to Find New Ones; This Time It's 'Cash Rich
Split-offs,' NEWSWEEK Bus., Oct. 26, 2004 ("When it comes to creating the most-
efficient manufacturing plants or fuel-efficient cars, we in the United States
still lag behind other countries. But when it comes to creating tax-efficient
corporate transactions, we continue to lead the world."), at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6337705/site/newsweek; Kaja Whitehouse, Learn
the Ropes, and Loopholes, for Gifts to Family, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2003, at D2
(recommending that "[i]f you plan to give assets to family members this holiday
season, keep in mind the tax rules and loopholes that can guide your giving");
Welcome to Diane Kennedy's Tax Loopholes (advertising that the "full service
CPA firm develops legal tax solutions for your unique circumstances that will
dramatically reduce your taxes"), at http://www.taxloopholes.com (last visited
Nov. 21, 2005).
2. See, e.g., Sarah Lueck, Creative Accounting for Medicaid: Bush Budget
Proposal Targets Loopholes That States Use to Garner More Federal Funds,
WALL. ST. J., Feb. 24, 2005, at A4 (quoting the head of the Alabama Medicaid
program who suggested that the state's success in garnering federal funding by
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maximization, it seems irrational for a taxpayer, health care
provider, or welfare beneficiary not to take advantage of regulatory
loopholes as long as the potential gains outweigh the potential losses
or liability. But widespread use of loopholes may come to be
regarded as unfair or "cheating." In addition, allowing individuals
and businesses to take advantage of unintended loopholes can
distort regulatory incentives and result in misallocation of
government resources.
The public and government respond to the existence of loopholes
inconsistently. Sometimes loopholes remain open and become
accepted as part of the regulatory scheme, along with the
affirmative regulations. Other times, public pressure, shifting
priorities, policy trends, or reform efforts drive the government to
crack down on longstanding "sacred cows."3 Because individuals
and businesses come to rely on loopholes as part of the institutional
structure under which they operate, regulators should take care and
apply the same measured, rational, cost-benefit analysis in closing
longstanding loopholes as applied in promulgating new rules. When
regulators do not approach closing loopholes deliberately but instead
react to public perceptions of "cheating," the response may
exacerbate rather than remedy the perceived problem.
This Article provides a detailed case study, in the Medicare
taking advantage of Medicaid loopholes "is exactly what all of us do when we do
our income taxes every year: We looked at the law and used the law to our
advantage."); Robert Pear, Health Secretary Calls for Medicaid Changes, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 2, 2005, at A12 (quoting new Health & Human Services Secretary
Michael 0. Leavitt who announced sweeping changes to Medicaid and observed
that "[Night now, many older Americans take advantage of Medicaid loopholes
to become eligible for Medicaid by giving away assets to their children"); Ellen
E. Schultz & Theo Francis, U.S. Drug Subsidy Benefits Employers, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 8, 2004, at A3 (describing a "little-noticed provision," or loophole, in the
new Medicare prescription drug law that allows employers to collect a federal
subsidy based on both employer and retiree expenditures); see also Editorial,
The Real Tenet Scandal, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2002, at A14 (discussing the
pervasiveness of Medicare loopholes); Editorial, Tenet's Shareholder Ills, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 9, 2003, at A10 ("After all, Tenet wasn't doing anything illegal in
profiting from Medicare's infinite flaws, and it could have continued to do so in
the many months it will take for the bureaucracy to churn out yet a new
regulation.").
3. See Jonathan Fuerbringer, Gauging the Cost of a Loophole, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 2004, at B8 (observing that tax reform will likely require the
administration to attack two "sacred cows," namely deductions for mortgage
interest and charitable contributions or "do an exceptional job of removing
almost every other loophole"); see also Lueck, supra note 2, at A4 ("When the
nation's governors go to the White House on Monday, they are likely to deliver a
blunt message to President Bush: Keep your hands off our Medicaid
loopholes.").
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context, of public pressure to close loopholes distorting market
incentives and regulatory program design and proposes certain
measures to prevent similar results in the future. Drawing on
behavioral law and economics literature, this Article examines the
post-Enron experience of Tenet Healthcare Corporation, a
prominent for-profit health care provider. Before Enron, market
watchers generally praised Tenet for its efficiency and innovations
in for-profit health care delivery, a model that was becoming
increasingly important as health care policymakers urged
privatization as a way to address skyrocketing health care costs.
But after Enron, the public grew suspicious of profitability and
looked for alternative explanations for high earnings. In Tenet's
case, the alternate explanation was a special payment adjustment
under the Medicare program-the outlier "loophole."
II. RISK PERCEPTION AND REGULATION
In the unique post-Enron culture, the public may have
overestimated the risks posed by corporate competition and
strategic conduct, including use of longstanding loopholes. The
result, particularly in the health care context, damaged the industry
and ultimately harmed consumers. The phenomena of the public's
judgment errors and other misperceptions of relevant risks
distorting government priorities are well documented.4  In
particular, people may overestimate the threat posed by a particular
business practice or private conduct. They may clamor for new
regulations or legislative changes based on high-profile, especially
salient, or readily "available" examples of a perceived problem. But
the public may inaccurately perceive the risk and fail to
comprehensively appreciate the consequences of government
intervention.5 The resulting legislation may be "bad policy" in terms
4. The literature on behavioral law and economics, casting doubt on the
classical "rational actor" economic model, is ample. See, e.g., Chrstine Jolls et
al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW &
ECONOMICS 14 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) [hereinafter Jolls et al., in
SUNSTEINI (noting that there are "three important 'bounds' on human behavior
[i.e., bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest] that
draw into question the central ideas of utility maximization, stable preferences,
rational expectations, and optimal processing of information"); Christine Jolls et
al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476
(1998) [hereinafter Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach] (noting, before
Sunstein's book, that "[tihe task of behavioral law and economics, simply stated,
is to explore the implications of actual (not hypothesized) human behavior for
the law. How do 'real people' differ from homo economicus?").
5. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 685 (1999) (defining "availability heuristic" as
"a pervasive mental shortcut whereby the perceived likelihood of any given
121720051
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of promoting efficiency or reducing risks.6 Scholars propose various
solutions to problems of judgment-error risk regulation, including
"rationalizing" bureaucracy and creating a group of civil servants
insulated from public pressure with special expertise and authority
to work across agency lines.7
A clear example of the public's judgment errors distorting
regulatory agendas and potentially producing more harm than good
occurred in late 2000 and early 2001 following the widely reported
sagas of Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Tyco, and other
unprecedented corporate accounting scandals, management
malfeasance, and bankruptcy filings.8 The public's post-Enron
event is tied to the ease with which its occurrence can be brought to mind,"
describing "availability cascades," and stating that "resulting mass delusions
may last indefinitely and . . .produce wasteful or even detrimental laws and
policies"); see also Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative
Decisionmaking, and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 933,
966 (2004) (describing Kuran and Sunstein's availability theory as that "which
refers to the tendency of people to think that events are more likely to occur
than the statistics suggest because they can recall past examples of such
events"). See generally Christopher R. Drahozal, A Behavioral Analysis of
Private Judging, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (2004) (discussing the effect of
judgment errors in arbitral decisionmaking).
6. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAIUNG THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TowARD EFFECTIVE
RISK REGULATION 10-11 (1993) (suggesting that regulatory priorities are not
based on rational cost-benefit analysis but plagued by judgment errors,
principally tunnel vision, random agenda selection, and inconsistency); Jolls et
al., A Behavioral Approach, supra note 4, at 1518 ("When beliefs and
preferences are produced by a set of probability judgments, made inaccurate by
the availability heuristic, legislation will predictably become anecdote-driven.");
Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059,
1059 (2000) (advocating cost-benefit analysis to not only promote economic
efficiency but also correct judgment errors).
7. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 6, at 55-63 (proposing to attack the
"vicious circle at its weakest point, the regulatory link, and to change the
circle's dynamics").
8. See, e.g., Ken Brown, Company Blowups Abound, Rebounds Rare, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 2, 2003, at R2 (noting that "in 2002, with every major sector...
down, the standouts are the train wrecks, such as WorldCom Inc., Tyco
International Ltd., and Adelphia Communications Corp"); Verne Kopytoff, Year
in Review, Annus Horribilis; Corporate Scandals, Lingering Recession Made
2002 Truly Horrible Year, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 29, 2002, at G1 (listing business
episodes during 2002); see also Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory
Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28
J. CORP. L. 1, 2 (2002) (noting that the "spectacular crashes and frauds of
Enron, WorldCom, and other companies, including Sunbeam, Waste
Management, Adelphia, Xerox, and Global Crossing" have reinvigorated debate
about government regulation of corporations and efficient market theory); Note,
The Good, the Bad, and Their Corporate Codes of Ethics: Enron, Sarbanes-
Oxley, and the Problems with Legislating Good Behavior, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1218 [Vol. 40
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enthusiasm for regulation of private industry invigorated
lawmakers, who passed new laws, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.9
Regulators responded to the mounting public pressure by adjusting
enforcement priorities, attacking previously overlooked loopholes,
and fast-tracking new policies. The resulting quick fixes, however,
failed to fully consider long-term market risks and, in some cases,
deterred otherwise beneficial business innovations and practices.
Health care providers were not spared from the post-Enron
corporate clean-up campaign. Long-recognized practices and
notorious loopholes suddenly came under scrutiny, causing health
care providers to react and retool existing business models and
strategies in ways that reduced their own revenue and, ultimately,
the availability of medical services generally."° The American health
care system is an instructive context for examining the problems of
agencies regulating in response to public pressure instead of
deliberately weighing the costs and benefits of a particular policy."
Health care regulation in the United States is tricky because of the
dual markets for medical care. Health care is paid for by both
private dollars, through employer health plans and private
2123, 2123 (2003) [hereinafter Note, The Good, the Bad] (listing recent corporate
governance scandals).
9. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified
in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.); see Larry E. Ribstein,
SarbOx: The Road to Nirvana, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 279, 293 (2004)
(describing the panic that lead to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley as an example
of "Sudden Acute Regulatory Syndrome" that follows market bubble bursts, in
which "investor heuristics ... support unreasonable pessimism about markets
and optimism about regulation" and noting that "[firaud becomes the media
story of the day, magnified through the 'availability' heuristic").
10. See, e.g., Nina Owcharenko, Congress Should Get Serious About
Medicaid, HERITAGE FouND. POLY REs. & ANALYSIS (Mar. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/wm705.cfm
11. See BREYER, supra note 6, at 57 (noting that, among other factors, the
"[clongressional tendency to respond quickly and directly to public perceptions
... all work[s] against the development of a more systematic, coordinated
approach to regulating risks"); Abramowicz, supra note 5, at 966 (suggesting
that cost-benefit analysis "prevents bad policies, which are policies whose costs,
if enacted, would exceed their benefits"); Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at
737 (noting that resisting public pressure, at times, is consistent with the ideal
of deliberative democracy as "[a] principal point of the original Constitution was
to ensure that representatives 'refine and enlarge' popular sentiment, rather
than automatically translate it into law"); Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1065-66
(suggesting that, given the public's judgment errors, "a highly responsive
government is likely to blunder" and that "cost-benefit analysis should be taken
not as undemocratic but, on the contrary, as a means of fortifying (properly
specified) democratic goals, by ensuring that government decisions are
responsive to well-informed public judgments").
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insurance, and government dollars, through programs like Medicare
and Medicaid.12  An intricate web of regulations and incentives
define the government health care programs. Tugging on a strand
to close one loophole risks unraveling another strand of regulations
and private market incentives elsewhere in the system,
compromising the overall scheme. 3 Program changes must be made
deliberately, not reactively, to avoid unintended results that
endanger the nation's overall health care system.
Traditional law and economics theory operates from the premise
that individuals act rationally to further their own individual self-
interest and, by so doing, increase the overall level of wealth in
society.14  Behavioral law and economics questions the traditional
12. The United States government is the single largest purchaser of health
care services in the country. See, e.g., Waste, Fraud, Abuse, and
Mismanagement: Hearings Before the Task Force on Health of the House
Comm. on the Budget, 106th Cong. 178 (2000) [hereinafter OIG Statement]
(prepared statement of the Office of Inspector General, Dep't of Health &
Human Servs.) (stating that the Health Care Financing Administration is
largest health care purchaser in the world); see also Thomas R. McLean,
Crossing the Quality Chasm: Autonomous Physician Extenders will Necessitate
a Shift to Enterprise Liability Coverage for Health Care Delivery, 12 HEALTH
MATRIX: J. L.-MED. 239, 255 (2002) (noting that the federal government is the
largest purchaser of health care services). The federal government also pays for
health care for the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program ("FEHBP") and
Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA"). States may also cover state employees'
health insurance and provide other welfare programs, including the State
Children's Health Insurance Program ("SCHIP").
13. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Shalala, 87 F.3d 350, 356 (9th Cir. 1996)
("Medicare and Medicaid are enormously complicated programs. The system is
a web; a tug at one strand pulls on every other."); cf Am. Lithotripsy Soc'y v.
Sullivan, 785 F. Supp. 1034, 1036 (D.D.C. 1992) ("The Court lacks the expertise
to decide whether or not agency action, especially in fields as arcane and
specialized as Medicare law and medical procedures, is reasonable, unless it has
the benefit of adversarial discussion in the rulemaking record. Similarly, the
agency itself cannot function properly without having the benefit of such
comments before it makes any final decisions.").
14. Modern microeconomic theory suggests that, as individuals or firms
undertake to increase their own self-worth, they increase wealth for society
overall. See James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD A
THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 1, 4 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds.,
1980) ("Since Adam Smith, we have known that the profit-seeking activity of
the butcher and baker ensures results beneficial to all members of the
community."); ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS bk. IV, ch. II, 484-85
(Edwin Cannan ed., The Modern Library 2000) (1776) (noting that the
individual "neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much
he is promoting it[,] ... and[,] by directing that industry in such a manner as its
produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in
this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which
was no part of his intention").
1220 [Vol. 40
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assumptions, drawing on empirical evidence demonstrating how
people "really" act. 5 That evidence suggests that people do not
always act rationally, seeking to maximize utility from a stable set
of preferences, based on optimal information and other inputs. 6 The
literature identifies three "bounds" on human behavior-bounded
rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest-to
explain how "real people" differ from the paradigmatic rational
actor. 17 The public's over-reaction and regulators' flawed responses
in the wake of Enron and similar high-profile episodes demonstrate
the first bound-bounded rationality.
Bounded rationality describes the obvious limits on human
cognitive abilities. We are not omnipotent or perfectly intellectually
adept. Given our limited brain power, we rely on mental shortcuts
and rules of thumb, which are rational strategies in terms of
economizing thinking time. But those remedies can lead to
judgments that differ markedly from what would be expected under
the rational actor model.'" One shortcut, or heuristic, involves
estimating the likelihood of a particular event based on how easy it
is to recall similar instances, i.e., the availability of other examples
of the same event. 19 The "availability heuristic" causes people to
conclude that an event is more likely to occur if they have recently
witnessed a similar occurrence than if they do not have a recent
example to draw on." But still, the likelihood of an event occurring
based on availability may differ markedly from predictions based on
15. See Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach, supra note 4, at 1471 (noting
that "[e]conomic analysis of law usually proceeds under the assumptions of
neoclassical economics. But empirical evidence gives much reason to doubt
these assumptions."); see also BREYER, supra note 6, at 35-36 (describing several
examples that psychologists have identified as impeding rational
understanding); Abramowicz, supra note 5, at 966-97 (summarizing Sunstein's
identified "predictable problems in individual and social cognition," meaning
the "heuristics that cognitive psychologists have identified as producing
systematic biases in human decisionmaking, as well as the social dynamics that
can cause group decisionmaking to err"). See generally Jolls et al., in SUNSTEIN,
supra note 4, at 13-58 (providing an overview of the behavioral approach).
16. Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach, supra note 4 at 1476 (summarizing
Gary Becker's description of standard economic principles).
17. Id. at 1476-77 (noting that each bound "represents a significant way in
which most people depart from the standard economic model" and recognizing
that "[aill three bounds are well documented in the literature of other"
disciplines but not economics).
18. Id. at 1477-78; see also BREYER, supra note 6, at 35 (suggesting that
rules of thumb and other departures from "rational" decisionmaking "may have
helped us survive as we lived throughout much of prehistory, in small groups of
hunter-gatherers, depending upon grain, honey, and animals for sustenance").
19. Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach, supra note 4, at 1477.
20. Id.
2005] 1221
HeinOnline  -- 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1221 2005
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
unbiased information. Drawing on "availability" to predict risks can
21produce judgment errors.' People "overestimate the number of
deaths from highly publicized events (motor vehicle accidents,
tornados, floods, botulism) but underestimate the number from less
publicized sources (stroke, heart disease, stomach cancer)."22 Those
availability errors can be costly for society by directing resources
and regulation toward the perceived risks, away from the risks that
are, in reality, more serious.
As individuals interact in society, their judgments and biases
tend to influence others' perceptions. When one person
communicates, through words or actions, his or her individual risk
assessment of an event, he or she provides information on which
others may base their judgments. As more and more people rely on
that data to develop and express their perceptions, the availability
of the example in the public's mind increases, leading to an
"availability cascade."" The classic example of an availability
cascade is the Love Canal example, in which residents expressed
concerns about the health effects from a nearby hazardous waste
dump to their neighbors, others in the region, and the nation though
media and other widely disseminated reports. The perceived Love
Canal threat led to mass relocations and, eventually, passage of the
Superfund statute, despite the absence of any good scientific
evidence validating residents' initial safety concerns. 4
The social processes that produce availability cascades include
informational and reputational cascades. When people lack
adequate private information about a particular danger or risk, they
rely heavily on information and data communicated from others.
21. Id. at 1477-78.
22. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1065.
23. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 685 (suggesting that the
availability heuristic "interacts with identifiable social mechanisms to generate
availability cascades-social cascades, or simply cascades, through which
expressed perceptions trigger chains of individual responses that make these
perceptions appear increasingly plausible through their rising availability in
public discourse"); see also Abramowicz, supra note 5, at 966-67 (describing the
availability cascade as "a vicious cycle in which an event leads individuals to
overestimate a risk, in turn affecting public discourse, which then exacerbates
the initial overestimation").
24. See Abramowicz, supra note 5, at 967 (describing Kuran and Sunstein's
Love Canal example, "in which residents' concerns about environmental
contamination from a toxic waste dump snowballed" despite the "relatively
small risk" actually posed by toxic waste dumps); Kuran & Sunstein, supra note
5, at 691-98 (detailing the Love Canal episode as an example of costly
availability error and describing others, e.g., Alar pesticide, which led to the
plummeting demand for apples, and the TWA Flight 800 crash, which led to the
creation of the White House Commission on Aviation, Safety, and Security).
1222 [Vol. 40
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For example, if someone living close to a hazardous waste site
perceives an increased risk of cancer associated with the site, a
person living far away, lacking direct experience with hazardous
waste, may go along with the belief.2 5 As more and more people
come to accept a certain belief simply because they think other
people accept it, an informational cascade results. Reputational
concerns also affect how people perceive and express their beliefs.
The desire to earn social approval or avoid disapproval may lead a
person to express certain popularly held views while not sharing
dissenting views. 6 An individual may be reluctant to express
doubts about the perceived risk in the face of a consensus because
the dissenter fears being seen as indifferent or uncaring if most
others are upset, or being seen as cowardly or confused if most
others are unconcerned.27
Availability cascades may be stoked by "availability
entrepreneurs." Availability entrepreneurs are individuals,
government officials, media, nonprofit organizations, businesses,
and other interested parties who understand the dynamics of
availability cascades and attempt to trigger cascades to advance
their own interests.28  By drawing the public's attention to a
particular problem, event, or example, availability entrepreneurs
attempt to drum up support for specific reforms. For example,
environmental organizations drew attention to examples such as
Love Canal or Chernobyl to gather support for environmental
legislation, such as Superfund.29  Similarly, competitors or
consumers could point to Enron and similar incidences of
managerial malfeasance to gather support for new corporate
25. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 720 (describing informational
cascades and noting that most people form risk judgments and policy
preferences through very limited information); Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1066
(describing the process by which one person's statement creates an
"informational externality," or signal, that proves relevant data to others and
leads to an informational cascade).
26. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 727-30 (discussing reputational
and other social pressures that cause individuals to tailor public expressions to
public expectations); Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1067 (noting that reputational
concerns, fueled by the availability heuristic, may lead the public to demand
regulation for risks that are relatively low while ignoring relatively high
magnitude risks).
27. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1067 ("If many people are alarmed about
some risk, you may not voice your doubts about whether the alarm is merited,
simply in order not to seem obtuse, cruel, or indifferent. And if many people
believe that a certain risk is trivial, you may not disagree through words or
deeds, lest you appear cowardly or confused.").
28. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 687.
29. Id. at 687-88 (describing availability entrepreneurs).
2005] 1223
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responsibility laws, such as Sarbanes-Oxley. Availability campaigns
may benefit society by focusing attention on long-festering but
ignored problems; however, they also can be harmful by redirecting
societal resources to relatively trivial concerns.
As the Superfund example illustrates, setting regulatory
priorities based on available examples and availability cascades,
instead of on unbiased data on the actual probability of certain
occurrences, may result in resource misallocation, or "bad policies."3 °
Superfund is "bad policy" in the sense that critics view it as one of
the most expensive and least effective environmental statutes, given
the relatively small risk posed by toxic waste.3' In addition to
producing too much or inappropriate regulation, availability
cascades may produce legislation that fails to reduce, or actually
increases, the same type of risks sought to be reduced or exacerbates
problems elsewhere.32
Similarly, public perceptions and regulatory responses that led
to Sarbanes-Oxley and similar laws passed in the post-Enron era
demonstrate the "bad policy" that judgment biases and cascade
effects tend to produce. In an already falling market, highly salient
and widely publicized examples of corporate fraud led the public to
overestimate the relevant risks and push for legislation that further
cooled the economy.3 As one critic noted, "[r]evelations of corporate
fraud coincided with public anxiety over the economy and populist
sentiments condemning the insiders who took great wealth out of
now-fallen companies9 4 Just like the Love Canal example, the
media contributed to the cascade effect by continuously reporting
and reinforcing the available examples of corporate fraud, even
30. See Abramowicz, supra note 5, at 966 (defining "bad policies" as
"policies whose costs, if enacted, would exceed their benefits").
31. See id. at 967 (noting critics' views of Superfund); Kuran & Sunstein,
supra note 5, at 697-98 (noting the negligible health risk posed by Superfund
sites, compared with other risks, and suggesting that had resources devoted to
Superfund been devoted to other risks, "there could have been major benefits as
measured in, say, life-years saved").
32. See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1068-70 (noting the problem of "health-
health trade-offs," deriving from the fact that the public and regulators tend to
"bracket" risks rather than appreciating systemic effects and recommending
cost-benefit analysis as solution); see also BREYER, supra note 6, at 22
(discussing several examples of regulators ignoring the external effect of one
intervention on another problem and suggesting the need for inter-program
coordination).
33. See Ribstein, supra note 8, at 46-48 (discussing the role of the
availability heuristic in shaping public perceptions, ultimately leading to the
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
34. Id. at 46.
1224 [Vol. 40
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suggesting a unifying, ongoing saga to draw in readers.3 5
Availability entrepreneurs, including the targeted corporations'
competitors, market analysts, fund managers, lawyers, regulators,
and other interest groups also played a role, directing the public's
attention and scrutiny toward unusually profitable companies or
firms that continued to thrive even in the post-bubble market.
Reacting to public outrage and seeking distance from unseemly Wall
Street profiteers, Congress quickly passed new laws and regulators
announced sweeping new fraud initiatives. But in so doing,
lawmakers failed to adequately balance the costs and benefits of the
reforms, including long-term market effects. 6
Tenet's experience in the aftermath of Enron provides a clear
example of the confluence of judgment errors, availability cascades,
and misguided policy reform. Enron and other companies provided
readily available examples of apparently innovative and highly
successful companies that, upon further examination, turned out to
have derived their remarkably high profits not from astute business
practices but rather from fraudulent schemes or questionable
transactions. Likewise, the public and market analysts had viewed
Tenet as a productive model of private, for-profit medicine. But that
positive perception shifted rapidly in the post-Enron era. In the
context of Enron and other corporate scandals, the public easily
accepted the intimations of availability entrepreneurs that Tenet
derived its high revenues not from legitimate market strategies but
from shady dealings-in particular, exploiting Medicare loopholes.
To the extent that the public was already leery of the idea of a
company making a profit from providing medical treatment, Tenet's
aggressive strategies and robust earnings confirmed suspicions and
drew scrutiny. But the risks associated with competition and profit-
motivation in health care delivery may not be as great as the public
perceived. The reforms demanded of health care providers,
generally, and Tenet, in particular, in the post-Enron era squelched
some private market innovations. Those strategies could have
offered solutions to persistent problems of access, quality, efficiency,
and cost containment in health care delivery. Under the Bush
Administration's trend toward privatization of traditional welfare
35. Id. at 47 (suggesting that "media's profit incentive to sell the story of
corporate fraud as a continuing saga of wrongdoing that readers or viewers
follow everyday rather than as discrete events").
36. See id. at 47 (noting that "the hasty adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
in the midst of a stock market crash was even less conducive to careful
weighing of costs and benefits than the circumstances surrounding typical
legislation"); Ribstein, supra note 9, at 293 (suggesting that "voters and
politicians looking for a quick fix to market ills may ignore regulation's long-
term risks to markets").
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programs, the existence of the reliable, competitive, private market
strategies on which to draw as models for government programs will
be essential to the success of any reforms."
III. TENET CASE STUDY
Tenet Healthcare achieved market prominence through a
variety of innovative and successful strategies. Aspects of Tenet's
business model also allowed the company to collect special payments
from Medicare, the federal health care program for the elderly and
disabled.38  Although Tenet does not appear to have violated
Medicare program rules or guidance in collecting those special
payments, the post-Enron public distrusted profitability and pointed
to the special Medicare payments as an alternate, illegitimate
source of Tenet's success. Tenet's rise and fall highlights the costly
effects of regulating the complex American health care delivery
system based on public risk perceptions.
Public outrage over the Medicare loophole and other perceived
abuses pushed Tenet to abandon various successful business
strategies. Regulators scrambled to respond to the public by
cracking down on providers garnering extra revenue through a well-
known, longstanding loophole in the Medicare payment system.
Society paid dearly in both administrative resources expended and
in the loss of potentially instructive health care delivery
innovations. Instead, had health care regulators been given space to
deliberate and assess the systemic effects of any proposed changes,
more pressing regulatory flaws may have been identified and
addressed to the benefit of the overall system.
Tenet is the second largest hospital holding company in the
United States, after Hospital Corporation of America, or HCA. 9
When the Enron story hit newsstands, Tenet owned 114 facilities
across the country, concentrated in the West and Southwest.4 °
37. See Jackie Calmes, In Bush's 'Ownership Society,' Citizens Would Take
More Risk, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2005, at Al (describing President Bush's
'ownership society" that would fundamentally alter New Deal and Great
Society welfare reforms by requiring citizens to bear greater financial risk and
responsibility, including moving Medicare and Medicaid to the "share-the-risk
model of group insurance ... in which individuals shop for health care much
like anything else, seeking the best prices and products among competing
providers").
38. Reed Abelson, U.S. to Review Big Payments for Medicare, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 2002, at Al.
39. See Neil Weinberg, Healing Thyself, FORBES, Mar. 17, 2003, at 64
(discussing the two corporations' relative market shares).
40. Press Release, Tenet Healthcare Corporation, Tenet Receives
Subpoenas Regarding Relocation Agreements (July 15, 2003), at http:ll
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Tenet rose to market prominence by employing aggressive,
competitive, for-profit strategies that were relatively unfamiliar to
medical services providers.41 By all accounts, Tenet was a model for-
profit health care company, in the classic model of a rational profit-
maximizing firm. For a time, analysts and policymakers touted
Tenet specifically, and proprietary hospitals generally, as the salve
for the broken American health care system.42 Eventually, however,
Tenet and hospitals employing similar strategies were "vilified as
greedy and corrupt."4' Tenet's once-touted practices drew scrutiny
and renewed underlying discomfort and skepticism about the
appropriateness of profiting off of sickness, death, and need.
A. Tenet's Rise
Until October 2002, by all objective measures, Tenet was "a
Wall Street darling,"" hailed as a successful, efficient competitor
that employed savvy business strategies to generate remarkable
www.tenethealth.com/TenetHealth/PressCenter/PressReleases/Tenet+Receives
+Subpoenas+Regarding+Relocation+Agreements.htm.
41. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 8, at R2 (noting that Tenet "had been an
investor's darling because of its solid fundamentals and strong growth");
Weinberg, supra note 39, at 64 (noting that "HCA was a free-market crusader,
growing feverishly by acquisition and dazzling Wall Street"). Cf Bernard
Wysocki Jr., To Fix Health Care, Hospitals Take Tips From Factory Floor, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 9, 2004, at Al (discussing trend of hospitals' adopting production
techniques from automotive assembly lines).
42. Laurence Darmiento, Prescription for Profit: Tenet Healthcare Boosts
Revenues, Influence by Adding Patient Services, L.A. Bus. J., Apr. 15-21, 2002,
at 1 (quoting the chief of staff whom Tenet recruited away from a neighboring
non-profit hospital regarding Tenet's "bare bones" efficiency demands: "They
run it like a business and in this day medicine has to be run like a business.");
Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet Healthcare, After Cleaning House, Seeks Purchases:
Company Now Posting Record Cash Flow, Is a Bidder on Four Big Hospitals,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2001, at B6 (noting that Tenet sought to acquire hospitals
in financial trouble, "a plight that characterizes more than a third of the
nation's 5,000 hospitals" and that "hospitals' woes come at a time when 'we
[Tenet] have a lot of capital to put to work'") (quoting Tenet officer in charge of
acquisitions); Charles Yoo, Tenet Stopping Bleeding at South Fulton Medical,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 11, 2002, at E6 ("For now, the bleeding has stopped at
South Fulton, thanks to privatization-the CPR that brought back the hospital
from the brink of death.").
43. Weinberg, supra note 39, at 64 (regarding HCA); id. at 65 (discussing
allegations against Tenet for over-billing federal health care programs); see, e.g.,
Kopytoff, supra note 8, at G1 ("Revelations about Tenet Healthcare painted a
picture of a company that specialized in high prices.").
44. Darmiento, supra note 42 (describing Tenet as "the envy of the
industry" and "a Wall Street darling"); Yoo, supra note 42, at 1 (quoting an
Emory University health policy professor: " [Tenet] ha[s] been Wall Street's
darlings. Their revenues are way up.").
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45.4growth4 in an otherwise weak economy. Tenet focused on core
operations in acute-care hospitals.47 The company abandoned its old
vertical integration model by reducing satellite operations, such as
dialysis, home health, physician practices, and health plans.48 The
strategy shifted to horizontal integration in key markets by
acquiring struggling hospitals,49 including community hospitals,50
45. Tenet's Profit Rises 30%, Beating Forecasts, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2001, at
C2 [hereinafter Beating Forecasts] (quoting bank analyst: "The quarter was
truly spectacular by any measure"); Barbara Kirchheimer, Greater
Expectations: Tenet Says It Will Beat Street's Earnings Estimates, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, June 18, 2001, at 46 (quoting Advest analyst regarding Tenet's
particularly strong quarterly increase in admissions: "It's a pleasant surprise,
but not a shock .... The company has been doing very well for quite a while.");
Andy Pasztor, Tenet Profit Climbs 41% to $280 Million, and Full-Year Forecast
Is Boosted Again, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2002, at B10 (quoting a Lehman Brothers
analyst's observation that "Tenet shares still 'continue to have a lot of sizzle'
because of the company's reputation for tight management"); The Money Gang:
Stock of the Day: Tenet Healthcare (CNNfn television broadcast) (Oct. 2, 2002)
[hereinafter The Money Gang] ("This is where we tap dance about Tenet
Healthcare."); see also James Bandler, Jump in Operating Profit Linked to
Stronger Pricing, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2001, at B9 ("Tenet... expected earnings
per share to significantly exceed analysts' expectations.").
46. See Don Lee, Tenet Says Earnings Will Top Estimates, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
24, 2002, at C2 (noting that Tenet "has outperformed the overall hospital
sector" and "has been beating analysts' expectations"); Jeff D. Opdyke &
Michelle Higgins, Will You Get a Bonus This Year? Surprisingly, Some
Companies Are Paying More Than Last Year, But Wall Street and Tech Suffer,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2002, at D1 (noting that Tenet already paid higher
bonuses than previous year "after racking up profits of more than $1 billion for
fiscal 2002, ... an increase of more than 50% from a year ago"); The Money
Gang, supra note 45 (summing up investors' attitude toward Tenet as: "I want
to own this stock. Because most everything on Wall Street I don't want to own
right now.").
47. Pasztor, supra note 45, at B10 (quoting Tenet CEO Jeffrey C. Barbakow
as saying that Tenet is reaping the benefits of "years spent developing a strong
portfolio of hospitals and honing our internal processes"); The Money Gang,
supra, note 45 (attributing strong performance, in part, to the "shift in [Tenet's]
business mix to acute care services" and "divest[ing] non-core businesses").
48. Darmiento, supra note 42 (noting that Tenet "got out of a half dozen
sidelights ... [to] focus on its core business of running hospitals"); The Money
Gang, supra note 45 ("This is a company that's benefited in a significant way
from paring the non-core businesses, the physician practices, the health plans,
home health operations, etc cetera [sic].").
49. Darmiento, supra note 42 (noting that Tenet opened a competing heart
hospital near a lagging facility with a second-rate cardiology program, recruited
a competitor's cardiology chief of staff, and eventually purchased the competitor
outright); Rundle, supra note 42, at B6 (noting that target hospitals are all in
financial trouble, facing operating losses or break-even results, labor costs due
to nursing shortage, and a lack of capital to invest in improved facilities and
new technology).
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non-profit facilities,5 1 and academic medical centers. With these
takeovers, Tenet was praised for its turnaround successes,52
emphasis on efficiency,5 3 and improved staff relations.54 Horizontal
integration also allowed Tenet to increase its market share,55 which
strength the company parlayed into favorable contract negotiations
with commercial insurers and managed care companies. Tenet
was able to command "strong"57 and "robust"8 prices because of its
market control and the overall high demand for its services.
50. Yoo, supra note 42 (discussing Tenet's acquisition of vital community
hospital for three growing cities and noting that "[n]ow that the hospital is no
longer tax-exempt, it has become a new source of income for [one of the cities]").
51. Darmiento, supra note 42 (noting that one physician was worried about
going from non-profit to for-profit setting); id. (discussing a University of
Southern California professor's concern that Tenet's take-over of a not-for-profit
hospital would compromise charity care but concluding that "Tenet is not quite
the bad operator he feared"); Rundle, supra note 42 (according to a UBS
Warburg analyst: "Tenet's low-key takeover of the Philadelphia system shows
that the relationship between not-for-profits and the investor-owned companies
is less adversarial than it was five years ago.").
52. Yoo, supra note 42 (noting that Tenet is "known for buying ailing
hospitals and turning them around").
53. Darmiento, supra note 42 (noting Tenet's "reputation as a cost cutter
and consolidator").
54. Yoo, supra note 42 (citing improved morale among doctors and nurses
and quoting a physician staff president: "I think the main challenge [for Tenet]
is that you have to create trust. You have to say that we're here for a long run
and we're here to turn this place around, getting back to top quality care."); The
Money Gang, supra note 45 (concluding that Tenet has been "on the forefront of
aggressively managing labor trends" and "getting at employee turnover and
nurse satisfaction"). But see Darmiento, supra note 42 (discussing labor
troubles from a nurses union and quoting a union representative's concern that
"Tenet's well known hostility to registered nurses and hospital staff forming
unions hurts patients and workers alike").
55. Rundle, supra note 42 (quoting Tenet's chief corporate officer in charge
of acquisitions: "We need to grow our share in markets that we're in. . . ."); The
Money Gang, supra note 45 (noting that Tenet "did a number of very astute
things," including "building these multi-facility networks and single markets
that's really contributed to substantial market concentration").
56. Beating Forecasts, supra note 45 (observing strong growth in revenue,
including increases in admissions and revenue-per-patient admission);
Darmiento, supra note 42 (noting that Tenet "sought to gain regional market
share that would give it bargaining power to extract higher payments from
managed care insurers"); The Money Gang, supra note 45 (assessing that
market concentration has "really turned into pricing power").
57. Kirchheimer, supra note 45, at 46 (quoting CEO Barbakow on "the
continuing phenomenon of strong pricing trends combined with strong
admissions trends" as a "potent combination").
58. Bandler, supra note 45 (noting that Tenet is "spurred by robust price
increases"); Anne Marie Chaker, Converse Tech Sets Lower Estimates for
2005] 1229
HeinOnline  -- 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1229 2005
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
Tenet was also a savvy investor, pumping capital earnings back
into physical facilities and new technology at its existing and newly
acquired hospitals, thereby improving the quality of care. 59 Tenet
took advantage of its strong cash flow to significantly reduce its
debt.6 ° Market prominence and ownership of multiple facilities in
the same location allowed the company to improve efficiency and
reduce duplication of services 6 through bulk purchasing of supplies
and acquiring new high-technology equipment for one hospital to
serve several facilities in the same geographic region.62 Tenet's
strategy also included product differentiation, in particular, focusing
on high reimbursement services, such as cardiology, orthopedics,
and neurology.63 Commitment to acute-care facilities and high
technology services positioned Tenet to meet the demands of the
growing "baby boomer" sector of health care consumers.64 Improved
Quarter, Year: Tenet Healthcare Corp., WALL ST. J., July 12, 2001, at B6 (noting
that Tenet attributed earnings "to robust price increases and admissions").
59. Pasztor, supra note 45 (noting Tenet's "continued heavy investment to
upgrade recently acquired hospitals"); Yoo, supra note 42 (noting Tenet's
acquisition of South Fulton Medical Center followed by $30 million worth of
repairs and improvements, including replacing ceilings, painting walls,
replacing duct-taped carpet with tile, buying new equipment for various
medical departments, and expanding the emergency department); The Money
Gang, supra note 45 (noting that Tenet expects to reinvest $1 billion in its
hospitals this year).
60. Kirchheimer, supra note 45, at 46 (noting that Tenet paid off debt of
$689 million for the fourth quarter and $1.5 billion for year); Lee, supra note 46,
at C2 (attributing strong growth to reduced costs, including lower debt and
interest payments).
61. Darmiento, supra note 42 (noting that Sister Carolita Hart, director of
health affairs for the Los Angeles Archdiocese, became "convinced that [Tenet's]
'centers of excellence strategy make sense in an era of competitive and costly
health care. 'You really cannot afford to have services duplicated."').
62. Darmiento, supra note 42 (observing that Tenet "uses its heft to
significantly lower purchasing costs for both routine supplies and advanced
equipment, such as $1 million CT scanners").
63. Id. (describing the strategy of establishing networks of hospitals that
specialize in these services, dubbed regional "centers of excellence");
Kirchheimer, supra note 45, at 46 (noting a focus on these specialties); Rhonda
L. Rundle, Tenet's Net More Than Doubles; Earnings Projections are Boosted,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2002, at D5 (noting that Tenet attributed its continued
strong performance to various factors, including a "shift in its business mix to
special acute-care services, such as cardiology, orthopedics and neurology,"
which "generate higher revenue, and account for as much as one-half of unit
revenue growth").
64. Darmiento, supra note 42 (noting that while these services "are
expensive to set up, the future payoff is assured, given the 83 million baby
boomers are aged 37 to 54" and quoting Barbakow's observation: "In your 50s
you start using [cardiology, neurology, and orthopedic services] more than when
[Vol. 401230
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customer service was also part of the strategy. 5 Increased hospital
admissions demonstrated that Tenet was providing services that the
market strongly demanded.66
B. Weakley Report
Perceptions of Tenet shifted radically based on a single Wall
Street analyst's report. On October 28, 2002, Kenneth Weakley, a
UBS Warburg health care analyst, raised questions about one
aspect of Tenet's government health care program reimbursement
and downgraded the stock from '"old" to "reduce."67  Weakley's
report demonstrated that Tenet's revenue share attributable to a
special payment under the Medicare program -the outlier
adjustment-was considerably higher than the company's
61
competitors. 8 As discussed more fully below, the Medicare
reimbursement methodology provides an add-on or "bonus" for the
cost of caring for unusually expensive patients.69 Weakley did not
suggest that Tenet's earnings were overstated but expressed concern
that the company was overly dependent on Medicare outlier
adjustments.70  In the prevailing climate of corporate scandals,
accounting audits, congressional probes, and record-setting
bankruptcy filings, 1 Weakley's report was sufficient to initiate a
you are younger and it goes on from there."); Rundle, supra note 42 ("Tenet says
its hospital admissions in the critical 51-to-60-year-old age group rose 12% in
the second half of last year."); The Money Gang, supra note 45 ("Admission's
[sic] growth was highest among baby boomers age groups.").
65. Kirchheimer, supra note 45, at 46 (noting a new "customer service
initiative"); Yoo, supra note 42, at E6 (quoting an analyst's observation that
Tenet committed capital "in improving services and facilities overall to make
them more appealing").
66. Beating Forecasts, supra note 45, at C2 (noting analysts' observations
that significant investments in facilities and equipment helped attract patients
to Tenet's hospitals); Lee, supra note 46, at C2 (attributing strong revenue
growth to "rising demand for more sophisticated and costly hospital services");
Rundle, supra note 42, at B6 (listing patient volumes and pricing as the two
biggest revenue drivers); see also The Money Gang, supra note 45.
67. Laurence Darmiento, Questions about Billings, Medicare Charges Have
Tenet Stock in a Dive, L.A. Bus. J., Nov. 4, 2002, at 3; Don Lee, Tenet Shares
Tumble 14% After Downgrade; An Analyst's Report Raises Questions About the
Hospital Company's Medicare Reimbursement and Whether it Can Sustain its
Stellar Growth, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 29, 2002, at C1.
68. See Darmiento, supra note 67.
69. See infra Part IV (describing Medicare payment methodology and
outlier adjustments).
70. See Darmiento, supra note 67; see also Lee, supra note 67; Rhonda
Rundle & Anna Wilde Mathews, Medicare Payments to Tenet Come Under
Federal Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 2002, at D4.
71. See Brown, supra note 8, at R2 (indicating that seven of the twelve
12312005]
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cascade of market and regulatory responses. Tenet's investors fled,72
and pending merger partners became skittish.73 Tenet's stock value
had reached a fifty-two-week high of $52.20 on October 3, 2002. TM By
November 9, 2002, the price had dropped to $14.90, a seventy-one
percent decline in value.75
In response to Weakley's report, Tenet officials admitted that
the company received higher-than-average Medicare outlier
payments but maintained that the payments were legal." The
outlier issue brought the company's aggressive pricing strategy
under scrutiny because a key element of the special payment
formula is the amount that hospitals charge for various services.
Also, outlier payments tend to correlate with high-reimbursement
specialty services, such as cardiology, orthopedics, and neurology.
In addition, Tenet's market control and ability to negotiate high
rates with commercial insurers had the side effect of driving up the
company's charges across the board, including charges to the
government. Higher charges produced higher Medicare outlier
77payments."
Weakley's report and the resulting scrutiny of Medicare outlier
payments were not Tenet's only concerns. The company was
attracting government and public attention on other issues around
the same time. Two physicians in Tenet's Redding, California,
facility were suspected of performing medically unnecessary heart
largest American bankruptcies occurred in 2002); see also Kopytoff, supra note
8, at Gl; Note, The Good, the Bad, supra note 8, at 2123 (listing the era's
bankruptcy filings).
72. See Brown, supra note 8, at R2.
73. See Paul Bartels, Hospital Examining Tenet Troubles, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 13, 2002, at B1 [hereinafter Bartels, Examining]
(regarding Tenet's bid to takeover Slidell Memorial Hospital); see also Rhonda
L. Rundle, Tenet Healthcare Says SEC to Look Into Stock Trades, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 19, 2002, at A3 (discussing Slidell deal); see also Paul Bartels, Hospital
Board's Chairman Resigns: SMH Sale Rejected by Huge Margin, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 8, 2003, at B1 (reporting on local voters rejecting the sale
of a community hospital and the hospital board chairman's subsequent
resignation).
74. Rhonda L. Rundle & Anna Wilde Mathews, Tenet Reaped Outsize Gains
From Flaw in Medicare System, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2002, at Al.
75. Id.; Karl Stark & Josh Goldstein, Tenet's Lucrative Medicare Billing
Seen at 3 Hospitals, PHIL. INQUIRER, Nov. 9, 2002, at C1.
76. See Rundle & Mathews, supra note 74 (reporting that Tenet expected to
receive 23.5% of its Medicare revenue from outlier payments, compared to
HCA's expected 5%); Stark & Goldstein, supra note 75.
77. Rundle & Mathews, supra note 74, at Al; Carolyn Said, Profiting from
Health Care: Hospital Chain's Steep Prices Blamed for Raising Costs for All,
S.F. CHRON., Nov. 14, 2002, at Al.
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surgeries.78 Around the same time, a Latino advocacy group accused
Tenet of overcharging uninsured patients.7 9 By January 2003, the
government had issued two investigatory subpoenas, one related to
Medicare outlier payments and another for an earlier fraud
initiative on "upcoding," a strategy for boosting Medicare
reimbursement by selecting higher reimbursement diagnoses on
patients' billing forms."' The government also was looking into
allegations that management at a Tenet hospital in San Diego,
California, offered physicians kickbacks for referring patients."'
Meanwhile, the Securities and Exchange Commission was
investigating high trading volume preceding some Tenet public
announcements, including statements regarding Medicare outlier
payments.82 Later, in the post-Enron furor, a United States Senate
committee opened a probe of the company's corporate governance
practices, suggesting that the company may be "ethically and
78. Rundle, supra note 73; Ronald D. White, Pressure on Tenet Chief to
Resign, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2002, at Cl; see Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet
Healthcare Agrees to Pay $54 Million to Settle U.S. Case, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7,
2003, at B2 (discussing Tenet's agreement to settle government allegations of
unnecessary procedures and surgeries at Redding Medical Center).
79. Andrew Pollack & Reed Abelson, Chief Faces Questions Again After
Restoring Tenet Once, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2002, at C2; see also Rhonda L.
Rundle, Tenet Healthcare Faces Lawsuits by Latinos Alleging Overcharging,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2002, at B6; Said, supra note 77, at Al; Carolyn Said,
Tenet Plans to Ease Up on Uninsured Patients; Hospitals to Cut Prices, Stop
Suing Jobless, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 29, 2003, at Al (noting Tenet's voluntary
policy change regarding billing uninsured patients).
80. Katherine Vogt, Tenet Shaking Up Board, Management, AM. MED.
NEWS, Apr. 28, 2003 (discussing upcoding allegations), available at http:ll
www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick-03/bisc0428.htm; see also Ronald D.
White, Tenet Profit Jumps, but Forecast Dims; Hospital Chain Cuts Fiscal 2003
Earnings Outlook as it Reduces the Amount it Charges Medicare, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 2003, at C1 (discussing same upcoding allegations).
81. Andrew Pollack, Tenet to Sell or Shut Hospitals and Cut Jobs, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2003, at C3 (regarding San Diego's Alvarado Hospital Medical
Center); Rhonda L. Rundle, CEO at Tenet Hospital Faces Charges on Payments
to Doctors, WALL. ST. J., June 9, 2003, at B2 (reporting that federal prosecutors
charged the Alvarado CEO with making illegal payments to induce physicians
to refer patients); Tenet Administrator Surrenders to Judge Amid Federal
Probe, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2003, at B6 (reporting that an associate
administrator of Alvarado, accused of receiving personal payments for
arranging relocation agreements, surrendered to federal arrest warrant).
82. See Rundle, supra note 73 (reporting that the SEC opened an "informal
file" on Tenet); see also Press Release, Tenet Shareholder Committee, LLC,
Tenet Shareholder Committee Asks Government to Investigate New Claims of
Securities Law Violations (Jan. 6, 2003) (announcing Tenet shareholders'
request that SEC initiate formal investigation), at http:l!
www.tenetshareholdercommittee.org/Press5.htm.
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morally bankrupt" and "among the worst corporate wrongdoers." 3
With respect to outlier payments, at least, Wall Street and other
observers failed to appreciate the inevitable and not entirely
unintended or objectionable correlation between Tenet's competitive
strategies and the lucrative outlier revenue stream under the
Medicare program. Congress created a limited pool of Medicare
payments to reimburse health care providers for serving patients
who are extraordinarily costly to treat. Tenet did not shy away from
the expensive cases but, rather, welcomed them as a part of its
business strategy. Tenet's aggressive pricing, focus on high-
reimbursement services, and investment in new technology
attracted the high-cost cases and allowed its hospitals to secure a
significant share of the special outlier payments. In particular,
Tenet astutely focused on delivering complex services in high
demand by aging health care consumers. The high demand for, and
complexity of, these services allowed Tenet to increase its charges to
commercial and private payors. As it turned out, Tenet's ability to
deliver specialized services and command high prices also tended to
generate Medicare outlier payments.
But after Enron and other episodes, Tenet's high earnings
attracted scrutiny. Drawing on the widely reported scandals as
examples, the public began to view strong earnings as an indication
not of legitimate business prowess, but possible wrongdoing and
questionable operations. Wall Street combed financial reports for an
indication that a company's profits could be explained by "cheating"
rather than "fair" competition."s The American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants' auditing standards expressly identify "[r]apid
growth or unusual profitability, especially compared to that of other
companies in the same industry" as a fraud risk factor. 85 The public
began to doubt the market's ability to self-regulate desirable
corporate conduct,6  and regulators responded. In July 2002,
83. Rhonda L. Rundle, Senate Panel is Investigating Tenet, WALL. ST. J.,
Sept. 8, 2003, at B10 (quoting the contents of four-page letter sent to Trevor
Fetter, Tenet's acting CEO).
84. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 8, at 49.
85. See Am. Inst. of Certified Public Accountants, Appendix to SAS No. 99,
Fraud Risk Factors, available at http://www.aicpa.orglantifraud/risk/38.htm; see
also Jonathan Weil, Did Ernst Miss Key Fraud Risks at HealthSouth? WALL ST.
J., Apr. 10, 2003, at C1 (discussing the AICPA standards in context of Ernst &
Young's auditing work for HealthSouth Corp.'s "massive accounting fraud").
86. See, e.g., PETER C. FusARo & Ross M. MILLER, WHAT WENT WRONG AT
ENRON 150 (2002) (suggesting that some view Enron's collapse as "the market's
way of enforcing its standards for honesty," while "[o]ther companies, fearing
the wrath of the market, were immediately forced to become more forthcoming
without any deliberative action from the accounting profession or the
government," and concluding that "[tihe true lesson of Enron is that one who
[Vol. 401234
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Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act87 specifically to address to
the widely reported incidents of corporate malfeasance.8
Scrambling to dispel the increasingly negative public attention,
companies like Tenet revised and abandoned various business plans
and strategies that generated unusually high, and now
presumptively illegitimate, earnings.
lives by the market can also die by the market"); see also FRANK PARTNOY,
INFEcTIOUs GREED 2 (2003) (arguing that "conventional wisdom" that "markets
would remain under control, that the few bad apples would be punished" is
wrong); Arthur Levitt, Jr. & Richard C. Breeden, Our Ethical Erosion, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 3, 2003, at A16 (former SEC chairmen discussing the importance of
investors' trust and realizing that, since Enron, that trust has been abused and
taken for granted). But see Susan Lee, The Dismal Science: Enron's Success
Story, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2001, at All (concluding that "no matter how one
views the purposes or operations of a competitive market, the history of Enron
proves that the market works pretty much as expected. And thus the story of
Enron is, so far, a success story.").
87. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections
of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). A proprietary health care company,
HealthSouth Corp., was the first company to be sanctioned by the SEC under
the new Sarbanes-Oxley corporate disclosure and certification requirements.
See Kate Kelly, Sealed, Delivered but Not Yet Signed by CEOs, WALL ST. J., July
25, 2003, at Cl; see also Patti Bond, A Fraud Squad Dream: HealthSouth Case
to Test New Law, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 11, 2003, at Q1.
88. See Erica Beecher-Monas, Corporate Governance in the Wake of Enron:
An Examination of the Audit Committee Solution to Corporate Fraud, 55 ADMIN.
L. REV. 357, 358 (2003) (noting that "Congress reacted to the Enron fiasco by
enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and directing the [SEC] to engage in
rulemaking to address the perceived problems"); Kathryn Stewart Lehman,
Executive Compensation Following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 81 N.C. L.
REV. 2115, 2115-18 (2002) (describing various corporate scandals and noting
that "[w]ith this legislation [the Sarbanes-Oxley Act] Congress intended to calm
a volatile market, inspire investor confidence, and stop the flood of corporate
scandals"); Robert Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 AMv. Bus. L.J.
417, 440 (2003) (indicating that "Congress responded to Enron and similar
scandals by passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act" and identifying the Act's attempts
to address some suboptimal, behavioral tendencies); Lawrence M. Solan,
Statutory Inflation and Institutional Choice, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2209, 2211
(2003) (indicating that Sarbanes-Oxley was "enacted in response to the
financial scandals of Enron, WorldCom, and other major corporations"); Harvey
L. Pitt, How to Prevent Future Enrons, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2001, at A18
(outlining the SEC's regulatory response); Michael Schroeder, Levitt Calls for
New Laws on Accounting, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2002, at A4 (quoting former SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt calling Enron "a wake-up call," and "the smoking gun
[that] has exploded"); see also Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Agency, Interrupted,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2005, at All (suggesting that the SEC's recent hands-on
approach to regulating markets, rather than trusting efficient market
hypothesis is "telling us something. They're letting us know the pressures and
expectations of society are finally getting to them.").
20051 1235
HeinOnline  -- 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1235 2005
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
C. Tenet's Fall
As Tenet's earnings and practices came under scrutiny, Wall
Street's darling became Wall Street's pariah. Tenet's "robust" and
"strong" pricing trends were recharacterized as "cowboy medicine,"8 9
"Wall Street medicine," " "turbocharging,"9' "too aggressive, ' and
"unusually hearty profits."93 At first, Tenet staunchly maintained
that it had done nothing illegal under the Medicare program.94 Even
if Tenet's strategy was not technically illegal, the investing public
remained uneasy. One commentator suggested: "The firm picked its
markets, concentrated on lucrative surgeries, and milked Medicare
for extra 'outlier' payments. That may meet the law, but the results
victimize both patients and taxpayers."95 Analysts and observers
renewed questions about the basic compatibility of profit-orientation
and health care delivery.9 Praise for Tenet's turn-around successes
and unprecedented growth was replaced by doubts about the
company's integrity and fairness . Tenet's own shareholders
89. Editorial, Time to Rein In "Cowboy Medicine," S.F. CHRON., Nov. 11,
2002, at A30 [hereinafter Cowboy Medicine] (describing high-pressure tactics at
Tenet's Redding hospital).
90. See Katherine Vogt, Suit Claims Unnecessary Surgeries at Tenet, AM.
MED. NEWS, May 19, 2003 (quoting opposing counsel's comment: "We believe
that the Tenet health system practices what we call 'Wall Street Medicine;'
They practice bottom-line medicine to drive their stock prices up."), available at
http://ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick.03/biscO5l9.htm.
91. See Said, supra note 77 (quoting a Service Employees International
Union representative).
92. See Bartels, Examining, supra note 73 (quoting the Slidell Memorial
Hospital board's consultant regarding Tenet's pursuit of outlier payments); see
also Pollack & Abelson, supra note 79, at C2 (noting that government "inquiries
are raising concerns about whether Tenet was too aggressive in raising prices").
93. See Said, supra note 79 (noting a UCLA bankruptcy law professor's
assessment that aggressive collection practices may have been one of the
reasons for Tenet's success).
94. Press Release, Tenet Healthcare Corporation, An Open Letter to
Shareholders of Tenet Healthcare Corporation (Nov. 18, 2002) available at
http://www.tenethealth.com/TenetHealth/PressCenter/PressReleases/An+Open
+Letter+to+Shareholders+of+Tenet+Healthcare+Corporation.htm.
95. Cowboy Medicine, supra note 89.
96. See Pollack & Abelson, supra note 79 (noting that Tenet's troubles raise
questions about "whether its quest for profits threatens its quality of care");
Rundle & Mathews, supra note 77 (quoting a Tenet investment firm
representative's query "whether Tenet managers 'prefer revenue to quality of
care'"); Said, supra note 7 (noting that "Tenet's approach to pricing is not
necessarily illegal" but that "a range of observers, including ordinarily profit-
focused Wall Street analysts, have begun to question the ethics behind charging
so much for health care"); Vogt, supra note 90.
97. See, e.g., Stark & Goldstein, supra note 75 (quoting a health care
analyst's assessment that Tenet "has left itself open to boundless questions of
1236 [Vol. 40
HeinOnline  -- 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1236 2005
GAUGING THE COST OF LOOPHOLES
prepared a report estimating the company's potential fraud liability
for Medicare outlier abuses at $6 billion.98
Attempting to restore investor confidence and avoid other
reputational sanctions, Tenet took various steps. Specifically, the
company dismantled its management structure, revised its pricing
policy, and voluntarily reduced the amount of Medicare
reimbursement it claimed by voluntarily modifying key features of
the outlier payment formula long before regulators proposed similar
changes.99 Less than two weeks after Weakley issued his report,
Tenet announced the departure of two high-level executives just
below chairman and chief executive officer Jeffery C. Barbakow. 00
One was Thomas B. Mackey, the chief operating officer credited
with developing the company's aggressive pricing strategy.'0 1 A
month before the government launched a nationwide inquiry into
Medicare outlier payments across all hospitals, Tenet initiated a
self-audit of its pricing policy and outlier payments. 10 2 The self-audit
revealed substantial and dramatically increased outlier payments in
recent years. Barbakow expressed surprise at the findings and
asserted that he had never focused on outlier payments until
integrity"); see also Cowboy Medicine, supra note 89 (urging that "there must be
sharp oversight of the public dime and the common good"); Pollack & Abelson,
supra note 79 (discussing various opinions about Tenet CEO Barbakow's
integrity); Said, supra note 77 (quoting a nonprofit research group
representative as saying that "Tenet is driving up the cost of health care in
California for everyone").
98. Glenn Singer, Tenet Healthcare Could Face $6 Billion in Liability for
Medicare, Panel Says, SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 8, 2003, at D1 (reporting the
shareholder committee's findings that Tenet increased outlier charges "in a
manner that lacks any connection to increases in the cost of its services" and
could be liable for treble damages and civil fines under the False Claims Act).
99. Press Release, Tenet Healthcare Corp., Tenet Volunteers to Adopt New
Outlier Policy (Jan 6. 2003) at http://www.tenethealth.com/TenetHealth/
PressCenter/PressReleases/Tenet+Volunteers+to+Adopt+New+Outlier+Policy.h
tm.
100. See Rhonda L. Rundle & Anna Wilde Mathews, Tenet to Restructure
Amid Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2002, at A3 (discussing the departures of
Chief Corporate Officer David L. Dennis and Chief Operating Officer Thomas B.
Mackey).
101. See Rundle & Mathews, supra note 74, at Al (stating that "Mr. Mackey
developed a policy to raise so-called chargemaster prices, a kind of health-care
equivalent of the sticker price at car lots").
102. See Rundle & Mathews, supra note 100, at A3 (reporting that a Tenet
"internal study found that sharp rises in certain prices at its hospitals ... have
led to increasingly large collections from Medicare of so-called outlier
payments"); see infra note 187 and accompanying text (describing CMS program
memoranda issued to local Medicare contractors in late 2002 and early 2003).
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Weakley began asking questions. 10 3 Barbakow's "Ken Lay-esque" 10 4
response of denying awareness of a scheme purportedly devised by
lower management did little to calm investors.' 5 Before long,
Barbakow was ousted from his posts, first as board chairman, 10 6 and
eventually as CEO."'
Tenet made other changes aimed at restoring legitimacy and
improving accountability. For example, Tenet placed a physician in
charge of its California division, 10 8 a geographical region drawing a
considerable share of the negative attention. The company also
replaced several board members and appointed a former auditor to
the board.09  Trevor Fetter, the interim CEO who succeeded
Barbakow, was made permanent CEO." 0 Later, Tenet's chief in-
house legal counsel and chief corporate officer, Christi R. Sulzbach,
resigned under pressure and concerns regarding her ability to
resolve the various government investigations and other problems."'
Tenet replaced Sulzbach with Peter Urbanowicz, outgoing deputy
general counsel of the Department of Health and Human Services,
103. Rundle & Mathews, supra note 74, at Al (reporting that Barbakow said
he "never focused on the financial impact of the outlier payments until
sometime in the week of Oct. 14 when Mr. Weakley ... called").
104. See Mitchell Pacelle & Rebecca Smith, Enron's Lay Resigns as
Chairman, CEO, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2002, at A3 (stating that Lay "has
indicated he wasn't fully aware of the details of the controversial partnerships
whose disclosure led to major financial losses").
105. See White, supra note 78 (noting that Barbakow "said he was unaware
of the extent of Tenet's use of the Medicare billing program," which led
investors, analysts, and observers to ask: "If Barbakow didn't know, why didn't
he? And if he did know, why didn't he address it?").
106. See Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet's CEO Plans to Leave Board, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 8, 2003, at A2; see also Debora Vrana, Group Urges Tenet to Split Top 2
Jobs, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2003, at C2 (reporting on the American Federation of
State, County and Municipal Employees Pension Plan's proposal and
Barbakow's offer to resign from board in the fall of 2002, when issues surfaced).
107. See Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet CEO Quits After Board Meets, WALL ST. J.,
May 28, 2003, at A3 (reporting Barbakow's early departure, planned for July
2003, and replacement by Trevor Fetter, brought in as president in November
2002).
108. See James F. Peltz, Doctor to Head Tenet California Operations, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 18, 2003, at C3 (regarding the promotion of Dr. Stephen L.
Newman to the newly created post of chief executive of Tenet California).
109. See Ronald D. White, Tenet Adds Former Deloitte CEO to Board, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 25, 2003, at C2 (regarding the board appointment of Edward A.
Kangas, former chief executive of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu); Vogt, supra note
90, (reporting replacing one-third of board and appointment of new chair).
110. See Rhonda L. Rundle & Joann S. Lublin, Tenet Names Fetter
Permanent CEO, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2003, at A6.
111. Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet Healthcare's Sulzbach Resigns Amid Critics'
Pressure, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2003, at B6.
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the agency that oversees the Medicare program. 11  Still re-tooling,
Tenet specifically recruited replacement executives from outside the
health care industry, including energy-industry veteran Robert S.
Shapard, as chief financial officer."1 3
Tenet also adopted a new pricing philosophy that de-
emphasized list charges,"' discounted charges to uninsured and
under-insured patients, and relaxed debt collection efforts."5 Those
changes facilitated settlement of various unfair pricing lawsuits."
1 6
In announcing the new policies, Tenet expressed a commitment to
"fair treatment of uninsured patients,""' 7 echoing the public's new
focus on corporate fairness over profitability. Tenet's voluntary
pricing and other policy changes preceded agency regulations on
charges to uninsured patients.
112. Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet Healthcare Taps HHS Lawyer as Top Counsel,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2003, at B4.
113. See Who's News: Tenet Selects Utility Executive As Its Chief Financial
Officer, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2005, at B10 (noting that, in addition to "utility
executives, Tenet considered candidates at banks, insurers and information-
services giants. Among the targeted high-tech providers were ones that provide
a lot of services to the federal government.").
114. See Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet Unveils Pricing Approach, Slashes
Estimates, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2002, at A2 (describing Tenet's "restrained
pricing philosophy" that deemphasized "'gross charges,' which rarely bear any
resemblance to what hospitals are actually paid for the services they provide");
Ronald D. White & Don Lee, Tenet Cuts Earnings Forecast for 2 Years, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2002, at C1 (reporting Tenet's new pricing strategy "that includes
discounts for uninsured patients" and is "mov[ing] away from reimbursements
based on gross retail charges set by hospitals in favor of fixed daily fees").
115. See Said, supra note 79 (reporting on Tenet's new policy to discount
prices to the uninsured and to restrain collection practices, including placing
liens on patients' homes).
116. See Rundle, supra note 79 (discussing allegations by Consejo de Latinos
Unidos); Said, supra note 79 (reporting on the settlement of ten lawsuits
brought by uninsured Latino patients in Los Angeles).
117. Said, supra note 79.
118. The practice of hospitals billing full charges to uninsured patients was
a nationwide problem. In a letter to HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson,
American Hospital Association members identified their understanding that
HHS regulations prohibit offering discounts to uninsured patients and require
active collection practices. Thompson responded that "[niothing in the Medicare
program rules or regulations prohibit such discounts." News Release, Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., Text of Letter from Tommy G. Thompson, Secretary of
Health & Human Services, to Richard J. Davidson, President, American
Hospital Association (Feb. 19, 2004), at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/
2004pres/20040219.html. The OIG also issued guidance to hospitals regarding
discounts to uninsured and underinsured patients, asserting that the agency
"fully supports hospitals' efforts in this area." DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., HOSPITAL DISCOUNTS OFFERED TO PATIENTS
WHO CANNOT AFFORD TO PAY THEIR HOSPITAL BILLS 1 (2004) [hereinafter HHS,
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Regarding Medicare outlier payments, Tenet took an
unprecedented step by voluntarily and anticipatorily modifying
federal Medicare regulations. Specifically, Tenet changed certain
key features of the formula for calculating outlier adjustments on its
own records several months before the government issued final
regulations implementing similar amendments. 119 Company officials
announced the damages, publicly declaring a desire to align with the
government's new outlier initiative:
We want to be part of CMS'[s] [Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services] solution to the outlier issue and we support
across-the-board modifications. To that end, we are willing to
step forward and adopt what we anticipate may become
central components of CMS'[s] new outlier rule as though the
agency had put it into effect Jan. 1, 2003.120
Tenet faced an estimated $700 million reduction in Medicare
payments as a result of the voluntary changes.121 At first, the
announcement had minimal impact on Tenet's already gutted share
value,122 but three months into the voluntary outlier policy, Tenet
reported quarterly losses of $55 million, or twelve cents per share. 123
HOSPITAL DISCOUNTS], available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/
alertsandbulletins/2004/FA021904hospitaldiscounts.pdf. See generally Lucette
Lagnado, HHS Chief Scolds Hospitals for their Treatment of Uninsured, WALL.
ST. J., Feb. 20, 2004, at A2 (quoting Legal Aid Society attorney Elisabeth
Benjamin: "This finally puts to rest the hospital's tired and inaccurate
argument that the government made them charge uninsured and underinsured
people these crazy inflated prices.").
119. See Editorial, Tenet's Shareholder Ills, supra note 2 (describing Tenet's
self-policing modifications); see also Medicare Program; Change in Methodology
for Determining Payment for Extraordinarily High-Cost Cases (Cost Outliers)
Under Acute Care Hospital Inpatient and Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective
Payment Systems; Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 34,494 (June 9, 2003) (to be codified
at 42 C.F.R. pt. 412) (revising various aspects of the Medicare outlier payment
formula).
120. Press Release, supra note 99 (quoting Tenet President Trevor Fetter);
see infra notes 141-94 and accompanying text (describing Medicare outlier
payments and loopholes). In particular, Tenet vowed to rely on up-to-date cost
and charge data and abandon use of the statewide average RCC in submitting
Medicare outlier claims. See Andy Pasztor, Tenet Voluntarily Cuts Amount of
Hospital Medicare Payments, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2003, at B7 (describing
Tenet's plans to "halto all outlier payments based on 'statewide average'
calculations" and to "rely on the latest available cost data to determine the level
of reimbursement sought from Medicare").
121. See Pasztor, supra note 12; Ronald D. White, Tenet to Alter Billing, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2003, at C1 (noting that $700 million was "the worst-case
scenario" and CMS Administrator Scully's estimate that Tenet may have
received $500 million in outlier overpayments).
122. See Pasztor, supra note 120, at B7 (noting that "[i]nvestors took the
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As financial prospects worsened, Tenet sought to further reduce
costs by selling assets, including fourteen of its 114 hospitals, firing
non-patient care staff, and restricting corporate travel expenses.
12 4
At the beginning of 2004, Tenet remained on financially shaky
ground, evidenced by continued restructuring, asset divestiture, and
revised earnings reports. 25  Management reorganization and
government investigations continued as well.126 By the end of 2004,
Tenet expected to report a loss, including write-downs on the
estimated current value of its hospitals and goodwill. 127 The
company also reported declining patient volumes due to increased
competition from outpatient surgery centers and declining physician
referrals. 28 The announcement sent Tenet shares down 8.1% to
$11.07 by the year's end.
29
announcement in stride, with Tenet shares falling only 10 cents, to $16.68").
123. Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet Posts Loss; Outlier Payments from U.S.
Plunge, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2003, at B6 (indicating the loss was due to a
reduction in outlier payments as well as asset write-downs and "soaring
medical malpractice expenses"); see also Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet Healthcare,
Hurt by Charges, Swings to Loss, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2003, at B4 (describing
Tenet's plummeting outlier revenues).
124. See, e.g., Stephanie Patrick, Tenet Healthcare Predicting Local Layoffs,
DALLAS Bus. J., Mar. 28, 2003, (noting the layoffs "as the health care giant
attempts to eliminate $100 million in expenses amid federal investigations into
its business practices"); Pollack, supra note 81, at C3; Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet
Healthcare to Cut Expenses, Revamp Hospitals, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2003, at
B3; Tenet to Sell Twelve Oaks Medical Center, HOUSTON Bus. J., Mar. 19, 2003,
(noting the sale as part of Tenet's strategy "to reduce operating expenses and
sharpen its strategic focus").
125. Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet Remains on Tenuous Ground, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 27, 2004, at C3 (summarizing an analyst's assessment that "a return to
normalcy' at Tenet is 'quite remote'"); Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet Healthcare to
Sell Hospitals and Take Charge of $1.4 Billion, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2004, at A3
(reporting Tenet's plans to sell twenty-seven hospitals, including nineteen in its
largest markets).
126. See, e.g., Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet Healthcare May Relocate Corporate
Office, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2004, at B5 (quoting Tenet President Trevor
Fetter's memo to employees: "it's clear to everyone that the Santa Barbara
headquarters location was originally created for the personal convenience of the
top executives . . . ."); Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet is Target of New Round of
Inquiries, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2004, at A9 (summarizing an analyst's
suggestion that the new inquiries could be "'isolated incidents,' but 'you never
know when one of these could mushroom into something bigger'").
127. See Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet Warns of Slow Recovery, Says it May Post
Loss Next Year, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2004, at A6.
128. Id.
129. Id. (discussing various challenges to Tenet's slow financial recovery,
including ongoing government investigations).
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IV. MEDICARE PAYMENT METHODOLOGY
To appreciate how the public misperceived the risks posed by
Tenet's conduct, it is necessary to understand some basics about the
Medicare payment system. The outlier adjustment was a well-
known loophole that regulators had previously reviewed and
adjusted but elected to leave open. Even assuming Tenet developed
a business plan specifically to take advantage of that loophole, it is
not clear that the company did anything wrong. But in the face of
Enron and other highly salient examples of corporate fraud and
wrongdoing, public perceptions of corporate responsibility and
fairness changed, prompting changes in regulatory priorities. For
the health care industry, the government's response to public
pressure produced "bad policies" that were poorly considered and
unnecessarily disruptive to the intricate Medicare payment
structure and incentives.
When the Medicare program was enacted in 1965, the
government reimbursed hospitals on a cost basis for all expenses
incurred in treating Medicare patients. Hospitals were paid a per
diem, determined retrospectively from the hospitals' actual total
Medicare allowable costs. 13 0 The obvious incentive under a payment
system like that is to spend as much as possible and order as many
services as possible because the greater the hospital's actual
expenditures, the greater the hospital's Medicare reimbursement.1
3
'
Not surprisingly, medical costs soared after Medicare
implementation as both the number of people insured and hospital
spending increased.'32
130. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes
Back: A Critique of the Backlash Against Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 51
ALA. L. REV. 239, 250 (1999) ("Over the past three decades, Medicare has
become much more sophisticated in paying for health care goods and services-
developing its own per case, per diem, and per service payment systems.").
131. See Randall A. Bovbjerg, Competition Versus Regulation in Medical
Care: An Overdrawn Dichotomy, 34 VAND. L. REV. 965, 970 (1981) (noting that
the "critical incentive" under cost-based reimbursement "is that an institution is
typically paid more for raising its costs and less if it holds down its costs"); Jost
& Davies, supra note 130, at 251 (observing that cost-based, or fee-for-service,
payment "creates incentives for providers to (1) maximize the volume of
profitable goods and services for which they bill and (2) maximize profit per
service by billing for the highest payment rate available for a service, while at
the same time minimizing the amount expended in providing the service").
132. See VICTOR R. FUCHS, WHO SHALL LIVE?: HEALTH, ECONOMICS AND
SOCIAL CHOICE 173 (1998) (observing that unintended consequences of Great
Society Medicare and Medicaid programs were increased health care costs and
physician incomes). See generally RAND E. ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 16-17 (1997) (noting that the "enactment of
Medicare and Medicaid coincided with the beginning of a spectacular escalation
1242 [Vol. 40
HeinOnline  -- 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1242 2005
GAUGING THE COST OF LOOPHOLES
To contain costs and reverse the incentives for over-spending
and over-utilization, Congress, in 1983, dramatically changed the
way that hospitals are paid under Medicare. 3 ' Under the new
inpatient Prospective Payment System ("PPS"), hospitals receive a
predetermined amount for treating Medicare patients, determined
from the patients' diagnosis at the time of discharge.14 Payment is
based on the diagnosis-related group ("DRG") to which a patient is
assigned at discharge.13' A hospital receives the same DRG payment
regardless of the number of procedures or services provided,
supplies used, or length of stay for the particular patient. The PPS
methodology is intended to promote efficiency by reducing the
incentive to provide unnecessary services or supplies."6  The
obvious, and intended, incentive is to spend as little as possible, for
if the hospital's actual costs come in under the fixed payment
amount, it retains the excess.
Under PPS, reimbursement levels are based on average rates
across all hospitals, and the particular hospital's actual costs or
charges for treating patients are largely irrelevant. 37 Therefore,
little opportunity remains to impact Medicare reimbursement by
increasing costs or charges. In a few areas, actual costs do matter
and may affect a hospital's reimbursement level. First, hospitals
may influence the DRG payment amounts to some degree because
those rates are derived from participating providers' actual cost
reports, which regulators review annually to determine the average
cost of treating a particular disorder. 138 Also, certain adjustments to
the basic DRG payments-including outliers, graduate medical
in national health care spending" and attributing part of the blame to provider-
dominated, cost-based payment system).
133. See H.R. REP. No. 98-25, at 132 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N.
219, 351.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., id. (noting that PPS "is intended to improve the medicare [sic]
program's ability to act as a prudent purchaser of services" and "[miore
important, it is intended to reform the financial incentives hospitals face,
promoting efficiency in the provision of services by rewarding cost/effective
hospital practices"); S. REP. No. 98-21, at 47 (1983), reprinted in 1983
U.S.C.C.A.N. 143, 193 (noting that PPS promotes efficiency by allowing
hospitals to retain payment amounts that exceed actual costs and requiring
them to absorb costs that exceed standard payment rates); see also Methodist
Hosp. v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 1225, 1227-28 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (discussing PPS
legislative history).
137. See Barry R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 13-10, at 121-22 (1995).
138. See id. (discussing history of Medicare cost-based reimbursement and
PPS implementation); ROSENBLAT ET AL., supra note 132, at 469-70, 484-85
(noting the same).
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education, and new technology payments-may be based on actual
costs. 9 Finally, the outlier adjustment that hospitals receive for
unusually expensive cases is based on actual charges for treating
the patient.
14
0
A. Medicare Outlier Payments
At the time PPS was implemented, Congress left open a tiny,
retrospective, cost-based "loophole"-the outlier adjustment-to
cover costs of cases that fall far outside the fixed, average diagnosis-
related payment amounts. Congress recognized that "there will be
cases within each [DRG] that will be extraordinarily costly to treat,
relative to the other cases within the DRG, because of severity of
illness or complicating conditions, and are not adequately
compensated for under the DRG payment methodology."' The
concern was that hospitals might avoid treating the "hard" cases-
the sickest and neediest Medicare patients-because they would be
under-reimbursed for those cases.
Accordingly, PPS calls for Medicare regulators to set aside a
limited pool of so-called "outlier" payments to defray the extra costs
142hospitals incur in treating these expensive cases. By statute,
Medicare outlier payments may not be less than five or more than
six percent of total standard DRG payments that CMS projects it
will make under PPS for any federal fiscal year ("FFY").4 3  CMS
must reduce total standard DRG payments by the proportion of
139. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 412.80(a)(2) (2004) (providing an extra payment for
outlier cases if the "hospital's charges for covered services, adjusted to operating
costs and capital costs by applying cost-to-charge ratios"); id. § 412.88(a)(2)
(providing for an extra payment under inpatient PPS for discharges involving
new medical services or technologies and providing one calculation method
based on actual costs for the new service or technology); id. § 412.105(f)
(providing an extra payment for hospitals that incur indirect costs for graduate
medical education programs, based, in part, on actual number of "full-time
equivalent" residents for a cost reporting period).
140. Id. § 412.84(k)-(m).
141. S. REP. No. 98-21, at 51 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 143,
191.
142. Id.
143. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(iv) (2000). "Total standard DRG
payments" means the DRG amounts plus add-on payments for new technology,
IME, and DSH. Medicare regulations establish the outlier pool, or target
annual outlier payments, at 5.1% of standard DRG payments. See Medicare
Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems and
Fiscal Year 2003 Rates, 67 Fed. Reg. 49,982, 50,122 (Aug. 1, 2002) (codified at
42 C.F.R. pt. 405); Medicare Program; Changes to the Inpatient Hospital
Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 1989 Rates, 53 Fed. Reg. 38,476,
38,503-04 (Sept. 30, 1988) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 412, 413, 489).
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estimated outlier payments to be made during the same FFY.'" In
other words, outlier payments are budget-neutral and do not detract
from Medicare funds allocated to cover "typical," non-outlier cases.
Therefore, even if Medicare providers collected more than their fair
share of the limited pool of outlier payments, those payments would
not endanger coverage for standard DRG cases. Another feature of
the fixed pool is non-retroactive adjustment. The outlier pool is
based on estimated, not actual payments, meaning that CMS is not
required to recalculate and adjust outlier payment levels at the end
of the fiscal year, even if the actual amount paid out to providers at
the end of the year comes in below five percent or above six
percent.
145
1. Outlier Payment Methodology
Initially under PPS, hospitals could receive extra payment for
two types of cases: "day outliers"-extraordinarily long lengths of
stay-and "cost outliers"-extraordinarily expensive cases.46  Day
outlier adjustments were available for cases in which the patient's
length of stay exceeded the mean length of stay for the assigned
DRG by a fixed number of days. 47 Cost outlier adjustments were
available for cases in which the charges for the case, adjusted to
cost, exceeded a fixed multiple of the applicable DRG, or other fixed
dollar amount.14 Under the original PPS scheme, day outliers were
calculated first, with cost outliers as a back-up method for
reimbursing high-cost cases that did not qualify for an outlier
payment based on length of stay.
49
Over time, the provision for day outliers was phased out
because the loophole was too obvious. Day outlier payments were
easy to "game" simply by keeping a patient in the hospital past the
fixed day-outlier cutoff. The loophole was particularly lucrative
because the later days of a patient's stay tend to be cheaper than
days at the beginning of the admission. Therefore, the hospital
144. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A); 42 C.F.R. §§ 412.80, 412.84 (2004).
145. See County of L.A. v. Shalala, 192 F.3d 1005, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(concluding that retrospective review and adjustment of Medicare outlier
payments are not required by statute and would result in undue administrative
burdens).
146. Id. at 1009.
147. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(i).
148. See id. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(ii).
149. Id. §§ 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(i)-(ii) (providing that the Secretary "shall"
provide an additional payment for day outliers and that providers "may
request" an additional payment for cost outliers); see S. REP. No. 98-21, at 51
(1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 143, 191; H.R. REP. No. 98-21, at 135
(1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 219, 354.
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derived a bonus payment from relatively low additional costs.
Certain government-commissioned studies of health care
reimbursement revealed that hospitals were being overpaid, and, in
many cases, profiting from day outlier payments. 50 Regulators also
were concerned that day outlier payments disadvantaged hospitals
that received a high number of transfer cases.15' Although a transfer
case may be costly to treat, the transferee hospital might not meet
the day outlier length of stay threshold because the initial days of
the admission occurred at a different hospital."' Accordingly,
Congress phased out day outliers over a three-year period,
beginning in 1993.153
But cost outlier payments remain. Just as providers could
increase their day outlier payments by keeping patients in the
hospital longer, providers can influence their cost outlier payments
through a different strategy. However, the loophole is less obvious.
The complicated formula for calculating the cost outlier adjustment
includes a hospital's actual costs and charges for medical
treatment.14 Therefore, by increasing charges-the "list price"-for
treatment, hospitals can increase cost outlier payments.
150. Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective
Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 1993 Rates, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,618, 23,640
(June 4, 1992) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 413) (summarizing a RAND
Corporation study showing that hospitals, on average, were being paid twenty-
five percent more than the marginal cost of care for day outlier cases during the
outlier portion of their stays).
151. Id. (discussing the RAND study showing that 38.2% of day outlier cases
were profitable, after the outlier payment was included, and that later days of
stay are considerably cheaper than earlier days for both medical and surgical
DRGs).
152. H.R. REP. No. 103-213, at 749 (1993) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1430, 1438 (noting that "the Prospective Payment Assessment
Commission has expressed concern that the Secretary's outlier policy penalizes
hospitals that receive a large number of transfer cases").
153. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(v) (1994) (providing for a three-year phase-
out by which "the day outlier percentage for fiscal year 1995 shall be [seventy-
five] percent of the day outlier percentage for fiscal year 1994," fifty percent for
fiscal year 1996, and twenty-five percent for fiscal year 1997); see H.R. REP. No.
103-66, at 509 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 738, 741 (mentioning a
proposed amendment that would require phase-out of "payments for day outlier
cases beginning in fiscal year 1995 and ending in fiscal year 1998); H.R. REP.
No. 103-213, at 749 (1993) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1430,
1438. Day outlier payments were phased out completely for discharges
occurring after September 30, 1997. Medicare Program; Changes to the
Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 1995 Rates,
59 Fed. Reg. 45,330, 45,367 (Sept. 1, 1994) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 412).
154. See Medicare Program; Prospective Payments for Medicare Inpatient
Hospital Services, 48 Fed. Reg. 39,752, 39,777 (Sept. 1, 1983) (codified at 42
C.F.R. pts. 405, 409, 489).
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Under the outlier statute, cost outlier payments were based on
the difference between the hospital's "adjusted costs" for the case
and a cost outlier threshold.1 55 Adjusted costs are derived from a
ratio of the provider's covered charges compared to costs ("RCC").
The RCC is designed to account for the tendency of costs and
charges to accelerate at different rates.156 Initially, a single, uniform
RCC, derived from nationwide cost and charge data, was applied to
all hospitals. 157 During the earlier years of PPS, the Health Care
Financing Agency ("HCFA"), CMS's predecessor agency, dismissed
providers' objections to the nationwide RCC.'58 Providers suggested
that the nationwide RCC failed to account for regional and other
differences in costs and charging practices and urged the agency to
implement regional, provider-specific, or hospital department-
specific RCCs to yield more accurate outlier payments.'59 CMS
consistently declined to amend the formula, citing administrative
ease and consistency with reliance on nationwide data elsewhere in
the payment methodology. 16°
But eventually, the agency shifted to provider-specific RCCs. In
explaining the policy change, HCFA acknowledged that nationwide
RCCs were having an undesirable distributive effect of transferring
payment away from struggling hospitals to already profitable,
efficiently operated hospitals. 6' Hospitals with lower costs per case
under the basic DRG rates have lower RCCs and, thus, stand a
better chance of exceeding the threshold and generating a greater
outlier adjustment than hospitals with higher costs per case.
Accordingly, HCFA amended the outlier regulations to require
provider-specific RCCs, calculated annually.'62 With this shift to
155. Id.
156. See Medicare Program; Prospective Payments for Medicare Inpatient
Hospital Services, 49 Fed. Reg. 234, 265 (Jan. 3, 1984) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts.
405, 409, 489).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 264-65.
160. See, e.g., Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient
Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 2003 Rates, 57 Fed. Reg. 39,746,
39,784 (Sept. 1, 1992) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 413); Medicare Program;
Changes to the Inpatient Hospital Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal
Year 1989 Rates, 53 Fed. Reg. 38,476, 38,503-04 (Sept. 30, 1988) (codified at 42
C.F.R. pts. 405, 412, 413, 489); 'Prospective Payments, 49 Fed. Reg. at 265;
Medicare Program; Prospective Payments for Medicare Inpatient Hospital
Services, 48 Fed. Reg. 39,752, 39,777 (Sept. 1, 1983) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts.
405, 409, 489).
161. See Changes, 53 Fed. Reg. at 38,507 (explaining the effects of
nationwide RCCs).
162. See id. at 38,503 (implementing provider-specific RCCs).
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provider-specific RCCs, HCFA planted the seeds for the Medicare
outlier payment "abuses" that drew scrutiny of Tenet and other
hospitals.
Calculating outlier payments using a provider's actual costs and
charges retains an element of retrospective, cost-based
reimbursement in an otherwise prospective, fixed-payment system.
PPS was intended to eliminate inefficiencies and incentives to
overcharge and over-treat by reducing reliance on providers' actual
costs and charges. But the cost outlier adjustment remains as a tiny
loophole inviting charge inflation.
2. Outlier Loophole
Almost from the beginning of PPS implementation, Medicare
authorities were aware of the potential for hospitals to increase cost
outlier payments by increasing charges. But year after year, they
dismissed concerns and left the outlier loophole in place. The
agency believed that the incentive to inflate charges would be
checked by other aspects of the Medicare payment system, state
regulation, or private insurance competition.
The most common way for a hospital to increase the level of
Medicare outlier payments is to increase the list prices for medical
services more rapidly than the hospital's actual costs are increasing.
The amount that a hospital receives for an outlier case is a
percentage of the amount by which the provider's adjusted costs for
the case exceed the outlier threshold."M "Adjusted costs" are
163. See infra note 175 and accompanying text (quoting regulatory
preamble).
164. The cost outlier threshold in the original PPS implementing regulation
was $12,000. Hospitals received sixty percent of the difference as the outlier
adjustment. Prospective Payments, 48 Fed. Reg. at 39,776-77. For FFY 2004,
the threshold was $50,645. Medicare Program; Change in Methodology for
Determining Payment for Extraordinarily High-Cost Cases (Cost Outliers)
Under Acute Care Hospital Inpatient and Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective
Payment Systems; Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 34,494 (June 9, 2003) (to be codified
at 42 C.F.R. pt. 412) (revising various aspects of the Medicare outlier payment
formula). Under current regulations, hospitals receive eighty percent of the
amount by which adjusted costs exceed the outlier threshold. 42 C.F.R. §
412.84(k) (2004). For a detailed description and example of the Medicare
outlier payment formula, which includes separate calculations for capital and
operating costs, see Change in Methodology, 68 Fed. Reg. at 34,495. CMS has
been increasing the outlier threshold rapidly in recent years in an attempt to
maintain the percentage of outlier payments within the statutorily required
five-to-six percent of standard DRG payments. See supra notes 143-45 and
accompanying text (discussing outlier pool). The higher the threshold the fewer
the cases that qualify for an outlier adjustment. In FFY 1998, the outlier
threshold was $11,500. Change in Methodology, 68 Fed. Reg. at 34,496. By
FFY 2001, the threshold had increased to $17,550. Id. The FFY 2002 threshold
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calculated based on the provider-specific RCC. 165 The "costs" that
are adjusted are the current year's costs, as reported on the
provider's Medicare cost report for the year for which
reimbursement is sought. But the cost and charge data used to
calculate the provider-specific RCC may be from an earlier year's
cost report. 166 That anomaly occurs because regulations require the
RCC to be calculated using a "final" cost report. Typically, CMS
takes several years to finalize a hospital's cost report.
After a provider files its annual cost report, private contractors,
or fiscal intermediaries ("FIs"), audit and finalize the reports.'67
Overburdened FIs may be two or more years behind in completing
audits and making final adjustments to providers' cost reports. 68 In
addition, even after a cost report is finalized, the FI may delay
additional months before implementing the adjusted RCC for a
particular provider. In the meanwhile, the provider's out-of-date
RCC, based on an earlier, and typically lower, charge structure,
continues to be used. By increasing charges in the current year,
while the RCC against which the charges are compared remains
constant, a hospital may generate larger outlier payments for
qualifying cases and cause more cases to qualify for outlier
adjustments than if the RCC were based on the current year's
was $21,025, representing a twenty-four percent increase. Id. The FFY 2003
increase to $33,560 represents approximately a sixty percent increase in one
year. Id.
165. See supra notes 139-45 and accompanying text (summarizing outlier
payment formula).
166. See, e.g., Medicare Program; Proposed Change in Methodology for
Determining Payment for Extraordinarily High-Cost Cases (Cost Outliers)
Under the Acute Care Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment System, 68 Fed.
Reg. 10,420, 10,423 (Mar. 5, 2003) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 412) (discussing lag-
time in calculating the provider-specific RCC).
167. CMS delegates responsibility for administering the Medicare program
and determining reimbursement amounts at the local level to private
contractors. Local contractors for Medicare Part A, which includes inpatient
hospitalization, are known as fiscal intermediaries, or FIs. Local contractors for
Medicare Part B, which covers outpatient services, are known as carriers.
168. See Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective
Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 1994 Rates, 58 Fed. Reg. 46,270, 46,347
(Sept. 1, 1993) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 413) ("Because we use the latest
available cost-to-charge ratios (which may be as much as 2 years old) to convert
billed charges to costs for purposes of estimating cost outlier payments, we may
be overestimating outlier payments in setting the thresholds."); Press Release,
Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services, CMS Takes Steps to Crack Down on
Inappropriate Hospital Outlier Claims (Feb. 28, 2003) (noting that "the longer
the lag between the historical data and the current charges--currently two
years-the less accurate the estimate will be"), at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
media/press/release.asp?counted=715.
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charges.169 In CMS's recent outlier initiative, the agency specifically
identified the "lag-time" in updating provider-specific RCCs as
creating an opportunity for providers to "game" the system by
increasing charges more rapidly than costs.
1 7 0
Another way that providers can increase outlier payments is by
taking advantage of a regulation that requires FIs to use a
statewide average RCC instead of the provider-specific RCC under
certain circumstances. If the provider-specific RCC is more than
three standard deviations, plus or minus, from the mean RCC for all
hospitals, fiscal intermediaries are required to revert to a statewide
average RCC.' If the statewide RCC is more favorable, in terms of
generating outlier payments, than the provider-specific RCC, a
provider may inflate charges to throw its own RCC below the three
169. See Proposed Change, 68 Fed. Reg. at 10,423 (noting that "[i]f the rate-
of-charge increases . . . exceeds the rate of the hospital's cost increases during
that time, the hospital's cost-to-charge ratio [RCC] based on its [earlier] cost
report will be too high, and applying it to current charges will overestimate the
hospital's costs per case during [the current year]").
170. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, PROGRAM MEMORANDUM
INTERMEDIARIES, NOTICE REGARDING COST-TO-CHARGE RATIOS AND INPATIENT
OUTLIER PAYMENTS, TRANSMITTAL No. A-02-122 (2002) [hereinafter CMS,
NOTICE], available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/pm-trans/A02122.pdf
("Analysis of hospital charges since 1999 reveals that some hospitals' charges
have grown at a much higher rate than the national average. Although these
extraordinary increases will eventually result in lower CCRs [cost-to-charge
ratios, i.e., ratio of cost-to-charges, or RCCs], the lag [time] between when
charges are increased and the availability of cost reports results in higher
outlier payments than is the case if the CCRs were updated more timely....
The CMS believes that some hospitals may be attempting to 'game' the current
payment systems for the purposes of maximizing payment."); see also Proposed
Change, 68 Fed. Reg. at 10,424 (noting that "a hospital has the ability to
increase its outlier payments during this lag time through dramatic charge
increases"); Press Release, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, CMS
Issues Final Rule for Outlier Payments to Hospitals (June 5, 2003) (quoting
CMS Administrator Thomas Scully: "Last year, CMS discovered that a small
number of hospitals-a few hundred-had been manipulating the outlier
formula by aggressively increasing their charges compared to their costs."), at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/pm-trans/A02122.pdf.
171. 42 C.F.R. § 412.84(h) (2004) ("[Sltatewide cost-to-charge ratios are used
in those instances in which a hospital's operating or capital cost-to-charge ratios
fall outside reasonable parameters. CMS sets forth [these] parameters and the
statewide cost-to-charge ratios in each year's annual notice of prospective
payment rates.... ."); see Change in Methodology, 68 Fed. Reg. at 34,496
(describing three standard deviations to the rule); Medicare Program; Changes
to the Inpatient Hospital Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 1989
Rates, 53 Fed. Reg. 38,476, 38,503 (Sept. 30, 1988) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts.
405, 412, 413, 489) (implementing use of statewide RCCs when hospital-specific
RCCs fall outside reasonable parameters).
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standard deviations range."' Tenet was accused of "gaming" the
outlier adjustment through both the RCC lag-time and statewide
average RCC methods.
173
CMS has long been aware of the outlier loophole and potential
for charge inflation. As early as 1989, in implementing the switch
from the single, nationwide RCC to provider-specific RCCs,
regulators identified and discussed at some length the potential for
charge inflation as a means of increasing outlier payments. 74 But
they elected not to address the problem, believing that market or
other factors would mitigate any improper incentives. 75 The agency
concluded: "[T]his incentive to manipulate charges is not new; in
fact, any measure of cost (including length of stay) that is based on
an indicator that is within the control of the provider provides an
incentive to manipulate that indicator. " 176 HCFA left the outlier
172. See Proposed Change, 68 Fed. Reg. at 10,423 (explaining the
vulnerability of the standard deviation rule)
173. See, e.g., Pasztor, supra note 120, at B7 (describing Tenet's plans to
"haltl all outlier payments based on 'statewide average' calculations" and "rely
on the latest available cost data to determine the level of reimbursement sought
from Medicare").
174. See, e.g., Changes to the Inpatient Hospital Prospective Payment
Systems, 53 Fed. Reg. at 38,509.
175. The preamble to the formal rulemaking noted:
Since both the cost-to-charge ratio (whether national or hospital-
specific) and the threshold are constant for the payment period, the
payment received by the hospital can be increased by increasing
charges. In addition, hospitals can conceivably change their charge
structures, just as is the case at present, to maximize their outlier
payments.
Although concern over this type of incentive is appropriate, we
believe that there are several factors that will mitigate its effects.
First, increases in a hospital's overall charges relative to costs will be
reflected in the cost-to-charge ratio assigned to the hospital in the
future. This is one of the strong arguments for the use of the hospital-
specific cost-to-charge ratios. Second, many hospitals are restricted in
their ability to arbitrarily increase their charges by the fact that they
must deal with other third-party payers, some of which base their
payments on charges. Also, several States place restrictions on
hospital charge increases. Third, a general acceleration in hospital
charge increases can be incorporated into the setting of thresholds in
future years, which would limit the potential benefit to hospitals.
Fourth, outlier payments comprise a small percent of total
hospital payments under the prospective payment system, diluting
the incentive for hospitals to disrupt their operations by drastically
and continually manipulating charges.
Id.
176. Id.
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loophole open but vowed to "continue to investigate potential
improvements in the measurement of case level costs.
1 77
CMS repeatedly declined to implement specific reforms to the
outlier payment methodology to address the identified loophole. 17
CMS annually reviews all aspects of PPS and updates the payment
rates and formulas, including the outlier threshold, through notice
and comment rulemaking. As recently as September 2002, when
CMS issued the fiscal year 2003 annual inpatient PPS update, the
agency again declined to address the outlier loophole. 7 9 The agency
identified two factors contributing to a rise in outlier payments in
recent years: first, a trend of hospital charge increases; and, second,
Medicare contractors' delays in updating provider-specific RCCs.' 80
According to CMS, those factors resulted in a higher than expected
number of cases qualifying for outlier payments. 18' To address the
unexpected increase and maintain the statutorily required five-to-
six-percent outlier pool, CMS increased the outlier threshold by as
much as sixty percent from 2002 to 2003.12 A higher threshold
results in fewer cases qualifying for outlier payments. In CMS's
view, hospitals' "inappropriate" charge inflation "caused" the
threshold to increase.'83 But the agency declined to directly regulate
hospital charges.1'
177. Id.
178. CMS, NOTICE, supra note 170 (providing instructions on mitigating
vulnerability but not making any changes).
179. See CMS, PROGRAM MEMORANDUM INTERMEDIARIES, FISCAL YEAR (FY)
2003 PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM (PPS) HOSPITAL, SKILLED NURSING FACILITY
(SNF) AND OTHER BILL PROCESSING CHANGES, TRANSMITTAL A-02-084 (2002)
(outlining changes but not addressing outlier loophole), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/pm-trans/A02084.pdf.
180. Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective
Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 2003 Rates, 67 Fed. Reg. 49,982, 50,124
(Aug. 1, 2002) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 405). Id. Specifically, CMS's data
showed that the average covered charge per case was $15,215 in 1999, $16,376
in 2000, and $18,015, in 2001. The charge per case increased, on average, by
7.63% from 1999 to 2000, and by ten percent from 2000 to 2001. Id.
181. See id.
182. See supra note 180 (listing recent years' outlier threshold amounts and
percentage increases). CMS proposed to increase the threshold from $33,560
for FFY 2003 to $50,645 for FFY 2004. Medicare Program; Change in
Methodology for Determining Payment for Extraordinarily High-Cost Cases
(Cost Outliers) Under Acute Care Hospital Inpatient and Long-Term Care
Hospital Prospective Payment Systems; Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 34,494, 34,496
(June 9, 2003) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 412).
183. "Because the fixed-loss threshold is determined based on hospitals'
historical charge data, hospitals that have been inappropriately maximizing
their outlier payments have caused the threshold to increase dramatically for
FY 2003, and even more dramatically for the proposed IPPS FY 2004 outlier
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3. Outlier Initiative
In late 2002, about a year after Enron filed for bankruptcy and
over a decade after Medicare authorities first acknowledged the
unintended loophole in the cost outlier formula, CMS announced an
initiative to identify "problematic" hospitals, meaning hospitals that,
in recent years, received particularly high levels of outlier payments
or rapidly increased charges.'85 The identified hospitals included
many of Tenet's 114 facilities. Through strongly worded public
statements, audits of hospital billing and charging practices, and
other tactics, regulators pressured hospitals to rein in their charges
and implement other self-policing measures.16
CMS announced the Medicare outlier payment initiative
through a series of informal instructions to local Medicare FIs.'8'
The program memoranda instructed FIs to identify providers that
either received outlier payments representing specified, relatively
high percentages of overall Medicare DRG payments or increased
charges by specified percentages.88 The identified "problematic"
hospitals then would be subject to closer scrutiny from FIs or the
Office of Inspector General through review of charge structures and
case-by-case audits of randomly selected patient files.8 9 In sharp
contrast to the agency's previous hands-off approach to the potential
threshold of $50,645." Change in Methodology, 68 Fed. Reg. at 34,496. Another
revision intended to rein in outlier payments was to adjust the outlier formula
for inflation using providers' charges rather than costs. Changes to the
Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems, 67 Fed. Reg. at 50,124.
184. See Medicare Program; Proposed Change in Methodology for
Determining Payment for Extraordinarily High-Cost Cases (Cost Outliers)
Under the Acute Care Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment System, 68 Fed.
Reg. 10,420, 10,425 (Mar. 5, 2003) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 412).
185. See CMS, NOTICE, supra note 170.
186. See, e.g., CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, PROGRAM
MEMORANDUM INTERMEDIARIES, INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING HOSPITAL OUTLIER
PAYMENTS, TRANSMITTAL No. A-02-126 (2002) [hereinafter CMS, INSTRUCTIONS]
(instructing intermediaries to perform comprehensive field audits and medical
reviews), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/pm-trans/A02126.pdf;
Press Release, supra note 168 (announcing proposed regulation designed to halt
"gaming" of the outlier system).
187. See CMS INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 186; see also CMS NOTICE, supra
note 170; CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, PROGRAM MEMORANDUM
INTERMEDIARIES, CALCULATING PROVIDER-SPECIFIC MEDICARE OUTPATIENT COST-
TO-CHARGE RATIOS (CCRs) AND INSTRUCTIONS ON COST REPORT TREATMENT OF
HOSPITAL OUTPATIENT SERVICES PAID ON A REASONABLE COST-BASIS,
TRANSMITTAL No. A-03-004 (2003) [hereinafter CMS, CALCULATING] (providing
guidelines for determining cost-to charge ratios), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/pmtrans/ A03004.pdf.
188. CMS, NOTICE, supra note 170.
189. CMS, INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 186.
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for charge inflation under PPS, CMS took an aggressive stance
under this new initiative. In the words of CMS Administrator
Thomas Scully: "Any hospital billing very high outlier rates better
be absolutely sure that they are right or they are likely to be very
sorry."19 ° CMS vowed to scrutinize "all operations of the targeted
hospitals" for any "improper conduct," including "any billing trends
or other indications of inappropriate reimbursement."1 91 Separately,
a congressional committee sent letters to hospitals suspected of
overcharging and publicized the list of hospitals that received the
letter.1
92
CMS's outlier initiative culminated in formal rulemaking that
amended certain aspects of the outlier payment regulations. 9 3 In
particular, the new regulations addressed the RCC lag time by
authorizing fiscal intermediaries to update providers' RCCs without
waiting on final, audited cost reports. Fiscal intermediaries were
further authorized to make year-end, retrospective adjustments to
outlier payments based on hospitals' most recently settled but not
final cost reports.'94 Those year-end adjustments allowed fiscal
intermediaries to capture any provider charge inflation that
occurred during the current payment period.'95 The final rule also
190. Press Release, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, CMS to
Clamp Down on Hospitals for Overcharging for Complex Cases (Dec. 3, 2002),
at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/media/press/release.asp?Counter=661.
191. Id.
192. Committee News Release, The Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Tauzin, Greenwood Investigate Hospital Billing Disparities for the Uninsured
(July 16, 2003) (regarding the problem of billing full charges to uninsured
patients), at http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/News/07162003-1040print.
htm; see infra notes 207-09 and accompanying text (discussing the uninsured
charges issue).
193. See Medicare Program; Change in Methodology for Determining
Payment for Extraordinarily High-Cost Cases (Cost Outliers) Under Acute Care
Hospital Inpatient and Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment
Systems; Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 34,494 (June 9, 2003); Medicare Program;
Proposed Change in Methodology for Determining Payment for Extraordinarily
High-Cost Cases (Cost Outliers) Under the Acute Care Hospital Inpatient
Prospective Payment System, 68 Fed. Reg. 10,420, 10,425 (Mar. 5, 2003)
(codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 412) (providing an abbreviated 30-day, instead of
statutory 60-day, comment period); see also CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVICES, PROGRAM MEMORANDUM INTERMEDIARIES, CHANGE IN METHODOLOGY
FOR DETERMINING PAYMENT FOR OUTLIERS UNDER THE AcuTE CARE HOSPITAL
INPATIENT AND LONG-TERM CARE HOSPITAL PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEMS,
TRANSMITTAL No. A-03-058 (2003) (providing the first set of instructions to fiscal
intermediaries implementing the revised outlier regulations), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/pmntrans/A03058.pdf.
194. Change in Methodology, 68 Fed. Reg. at 34,509.
195. Id. at 34,499 (establishing a new regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 412.84(i)(1),
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eliminated the reversion to the statewide average RCC for hospitals
falling below the lower limit. 96 Providers with RCCs exceeding the
upper limit and providers without historical cost and charge data
could still revert to the statewide RCC to calculate outlier
adjustments. 197
B. Health Care Pricing
The one aspect of the outlier payment methodology that CMS
did not address in informal memoranda, press releases, or the
formal outlier regulations is the one feature that CMS expressly
identified as the root of the problem-hospital charge inflation. The
most likely explanation for this omission is that CMS lacks
authority to regulate charges. As the preamble to the new outlier
regulations expressly states: "Hospitals set their own level of
charges and are able to change their charges, without review by
their fiscal intermediaries.' 98  This statement confirms CMS's
historical understanding that the agency has no authority to
regulate hospital pricing or charge structures.
1. Medicare Regulation of Pricing
A fundamental principle of the Medicare program is regulatory
noninterference with health care providers' business activities,
including establishing charges for services and supplies. The
preamble to the Social Security Act, provides: "Nothing in this title
[of the Social Security Act] shall be construed to authorize any
Federal officer or employee. .. to exercise any supervision or control
over the administration or operation of any such institution, agency,
or person."'99 A key function of hospital administration is to
establish and update charges for medical supplies and services.
Therefore, a reasonable interpretation of the statutory provision
suggests that the government lacks authority to supervise or control
hospitals' charging practices or price increases.2°°
authorizing CMS to instruct fiscal intermediaries to use updated, non-final data
and allowing providers to request use of the same data); id. at 34,504
(establishing a new section, 412.84(i)(3), regarding year-end reconciliation, and
indicating that CMS would issue further instructions to fiscal intermediaries
through program memoranda).
196. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (describing former
regulation).
197. Change in Methodology, 68 Fed. Reg. at 34,500 (implementing revisions
at section 412.84(h), (i)(1)).
198. Proposed Change in Methodology, 68 Fed. Reg. at 10,425.
199. Social Security Act § 1801, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2000).
200. For the most part, the federal government has complied with this
directive. Attempts to regulate hospital charges were either short-lived or
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Out of apparent respect for that principle, federal regulators
traditionally accorded Medicare providers considerable discretion in
setting charges and updating prices. No Medicare regulations or
instructions require hospitals to establish particular prices or limit
the amount by which they may increase charges. In fact, Medicare
program instructions specifically prohibit the agency from
regulating charges: "[T]he Medicare program cannot dictate to a
provider what its charges or charge structure may be .... ,,201 But
certain Medicare reimbursement principles and regulations could
provide a hook for CMS to crack down on charge inflation under the
outlier payment initiative.
One potential hook CMS might use to regulate charges appears
in the old Medicare cost reimbursement regulations. Prior to PPS
implementation, hospitals were paid the lower of their reasonable
costs or customary charges ("LCC"). 21 2 The LCC regulations defined
"customary charges" as "the regular rates that providers charge both
beneficiaries and other paying patients for the services furnished to
them."0 3 Similarly, Medicare program instructions interpreted the
LCC regulation to mean that "customary charges" are charges
actually "imposed uniformly on most patients."2 4 The Medicare
instructions provide further that "customary charges" must
"actually be collected from a substantial percentage of patients
liable for payment on a charge basis."20 5  The intent of those
requirements was to prevent providers from gouging the
government with high prices while offering discounts or write-offs to
commercial payors. In practice, however, commercial insurers
typically negotiate discounted or special rates, and the government
pays based on DRGs or fee schedules. Accordingly, the only
"[p]atients liable for payment on a charge basis" are self-pay or
never enacted. For example, President Nixon's Economic Stabilization Program
("ESP"), which was in place from November 1971 to April 1974, implemented
national wage and price controls, including hospital rate controls. See
ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 132, at 481-83; see also PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 423 (1982) (noting that providers
responded to price controls by increasing volume and, after ESP was repealed,
increased fees to compensate for the losses). In 1977, President Carter
proposed to limit hospital rate increases to 1.5% of the gross consumer price
index and to cap such increases at nine percent annually, but the proposal
failed. See ROSENBLATT ETAL., supra note 132, at 484; STARR, supra, at 412.
201. HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., PROVIDER REIMBURSEMENT MANUAL § 2203 (1997) [hereinafter MANUAL].
202. 42 C.F.R. § 413.1(b) (2004).
203. Id. § 413.13(a).
204. MANUAL, supra note 201, § 2604.3.
205. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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uninsured patients."6 Read together, the LCC regulations and
interpreting instructions create an incentive for aggressive
collection practices against uninsured patients. 7
Also, Medicare cost-reimbursement principles emphasize
uniformity, meaning that providers must charge the same rates to
all payors-commercial insurers, government health care programs,
and self-pay patients. The principle of uniform charges created a
pitfall, however, because hospitals interpreted the principle as
requiring them to charge all patients, including the uninsured, the
same list price and disallowing price adjustments, discounts, or
sliding-scales based on patients' ability to pay.08 Accordingly,
Tenet's practice of charging its full, "strong' or "robust" prices to
uninsured patients arguably was necessary to comply with Medicare
rules. But that practice of demanding full charges from uninsured
patients attracted public scorn and lawsuits alleging price-
209gouging.
Other regulations, no longer applicable under PPS, echo the
uniformity principle and suggest additional limits on providers'
discretion in establishing charges. According to cost reimbursement
regulations, charges should be "reasonable" and bear some relation
to the actual cost of care. 10 In their annual cost reports, providers
must distinguish between reimbursable costs, meaning costs
attributable to serving Medicare patients, and excluded costs,
meaning costs attributable to treating non-Medicare patients.21 1 The
regulations and instructions regarding this "cost apportionment"
process provide: "Charges means the regular rates for various
services that are charged to both beneficiaries and other paying
patients who receive the services. Implicit in the use of charges as
206. See id. § 2604.3(B)(1).
207. CMS, in other contexts, has similarly addressed incentives to collect
from uninsured patients, specifically encouraging providers to pursue collection
practices. For example, in proposing changes to reduce the amount of extra
Medicare payments available to hospitals for "bad debt," the agency noted that
the current liberal bad-debt policy "provides an incentive to the provider to
forego effective collection efforts in return for the certainty of Medicare
payments." Medicare Program; Provider Bad Debt Payment, 68 Fed. Reg.
6,682, 6,684 (Feb. 10, 2003) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 413).
208. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (describing Health &
Human Services' and the Inspector General's responses to hospitals' pricing
practices towards the uninsured).
209. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (describing lawsuits and
Tenet's response).
210. 42 C.F.R. § 413.9 (2004).
211. Id. §§ 413.9, 413.20.
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the basis for apportionment is the objective that charges for services
be related to the cost of the services.,
21 2
Medicare instructions interpreting the regulation specify that
"each facility should have an established charge structure which is
applied uniformly to each patient" and "which is reasonably and
consistently related to the cost of providing the services."212
Although CMS could rely on those provisions to regulate hospital
charges, the provisions are phrased in precatory rather than
mandatory terms, which leave room to argue that charges "should"
be, but are not necessarily required to be, uniform.
A final reference to hospital charges appears in the Social
Security Act and Medicare regulations pertaining to the Office of
Inspector General's ("OIG") enforcement authority.214 The OIG is
authorized to impose civil and criminal fines and exclude providers
from participating in the Medicare program for particular
misconduct.215 Specifically, the OIG may exclude a provider that has
"[slubmitted, or caused to be submitted, bills or requests for
payments under Medicare ... containing charges or costs for items
or services furnished that are substantially in excess of such
individual or entity's usual charges or costs for such items or
services."21 6  Less strongly worded than the LCC and cost
apportionment regulations, the OIG regulations do not require
uniform charges or charges that bear relation to costs. The OIG
provision requires only that the provider's charges to the
government are usual and not "substantially in excess" of amounts
charged to other payors.2 17
CMS is gradually abandoning charge-based payment in many
areas of the Medicare program, but the OIG provision has recently
been given new teeth. Recent agency guidance now clarifies that the
OIG has discretion in imposing sanctions, including program
exclusion, for providers submitting claims for amounts
"substantially in excess" of usual charges and notes a statutory good
cause exception. 218 Also, the OIG proposed amendments that would
212. Id. § 413.53(b)(2)(ii).
213. MANUAL, supra note 201, § 2203.
214. See generally Social Security Act §§ 1128-1129A, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7
to 1320a-8b (2000); 42 C.F.R. §§ 1001-08 (2004).
215. See Social Security Act §§ 1128A-11298B, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7a to
1320a-7b; 42 C.F.R. §§ 1001, 1003.
216. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.701(a)(1); see also Social Security Act § 1128(b)(6), 42
U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(6) (regarding the OIG's permissive exclusion authority for
excessive charges).
217. See Social Security Act § 1128(b)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(6); 42 C.F.R.
§ 1001.701(a)(1).
218. See HHS, HOSPITAL DISCOUNTS, supra note 118, at 1-2 (addressing
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explicitly define the key terms "substantially in excess" and "usual
charges."21 9 In the preamble to the proposed rule, the OIG expressed
concern over charge inflation and noted the continued relevance of
charges, even after PPS implementation. Specifically, the notice
identifies that Medicare Part B and "[o]ther Medicare payment
provisions, such as the inpatient outlier payment methodology, also
depend in whole or part on a provider's costs or charges."22 ° The
renewed attention to the OIG regulations suggests the direction in
which authorities may be headed in regulating hospital charges,
despite the historical hands-off approach.
In addition to concern over outlier payments, the uninsured
charges issue and the Tenet pricing abuse lawsuits prompted CMS
to issue various guidance statements on hospital practices. The
agency disavowed any interpretation of Medicare regulations that
would require hospitals to demand full charges or engage in
aggressive collection practices against uninsured patients. The
agency asserts that the recent statements "reflect[] no change to
existing policy."22' Despite CMS's announced policy on hospital
charges and uninsured patients, Medicare providers still may
rationally fear both informal and formal sanctions for violating the
uniform charges and other provisions.222 First, Medicare regulations
223
are notoriously indeterminate. In addition, CMS has a history of
regulatory indifference followed by unexpected, zealous
providers' concerns that offering discounts to uninsured patients would violate
various program laws and guidance).
219. See id. at 2; Medicare and Federal Health Care Programs: Fraud and
Abuse; Clarification of Terms and Application of Program Exclusion Authority
for Submitting Claims Containing Excessive Charges, 68 Fed. Reg. 53,939,
53,940-43 (Sept. 15, 2003) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 412).
220. Clarification of Terms, 68 Fed. Reg. at 53,940.
221. See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDLEARN MATTERS:
INFORMATION FOR MEDICARE PROVIDERS, REMINDER: HOSPITAL DISCOUNTS
PERMITTED FOR INDIGENT, UNINSURED, AND UNDERINSURED PATIENTS, No.
SE0405, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medlearn/matters/mmarticles/
2004/SE0405.pdf.
222. See id.; News Release, supra note 118 ("Your letter suggests that HHS
regulations require hospitals to bill all patients using the same schedule of
charges and suggests that as a result, the uninsured are forced to pay 'full price'
for their care. That suggestion is not correct and certainly does not accurately
reflect my policy."). See generally CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES,
QUESTIONS ON CHARGES FOR THE UNINSURED (Feb. 17, 2004) (discussing various
implications of CMS and OIG regulations on charges to uninsured patients and
providing that discounts to uninsured patients do not affect a provider's RCC as
long as full charges are listed on the Medicare cost report), available at
http://cms.hhs.gov/FAQUninsured.pdf.
223. See, e.g., Clarification of Terms, 68 Fed. Reg. at 59,340.
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enforcement. Informal sanctions might include audits and
investigations of hospital charges, such as the audits announced in
the outlier program memoranda. Moreover, the government has
authority to impose formal sanctions, including steep fines and loss
of all Medicare revenue through program exclusion, for health care
fraud and abuse.2 5 Finally, CMS followed a similar strategy to
reduce overcharges in an analogous context-prescription drug
prices under Medicare and Medicaid.
2. Prescription Drug Pricing Analogy
Another Medicare and Medicaid loophole, similar to the outlier
loophole, allows providers to increase reimbursement by increasing
charges for pharmaceutical products. Under Medicare Part B, the
Medicaid program, prescription drugs were reimbursed according to
formulas based on the drugs' average wholesale price ("AWP").226
Pharmaceutical manufacturers and suppliers were free to set the
AWP, just as hospitals were free to set hospital charges.227 Until
recently, drug pricing issues under Medicare were limited to a
narrow class of Part B outpatient drugs because drugs prescribed to
patients during inpatient hospital stays are included in the bundled
DRG payments."'
The recently enacted Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 ("MMA")2
2 9
dramatically overhauled Medicare coverage, adding a broad
prescription drug benefit for outpatient drugs. The legislation
codifies the Medicare noninterference policy and expressly prohibits
the government from negotiating with pharmaceutical companies on
224. See, e.g., infra notes 236-39 and accompanying text (describing the
prescription drug pricing crack-down).
225. See David A. Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Market Change,
Social Norms, and the Trust "Reposed in the Workmen," 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 531,
550 (2001) (describing a history of inconsistent enforcement and potential for
steep sanctions when regulatory priorities change).
226. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(o)(1) (2000).
227. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text (describing Medicare
PPS and DRG payment structure for inpatient hospital care). The cost of drugs
and biologics supplied to hospital inpatients, under Medicare Part A, are
bundled into the DRG payment. Drugs and biologics furnished to an inpatient
for use outside the hospital, i.e., post-discharge or as a hospital outpatient,
other than a limited supply necessary to facilitate discharge, generally are not
covered under Part A. See HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE CARRIERS MANUAL, Part 3, Claims Process
§ 3101(3)(E) (1984) [hereinafter CARRIERS MANUAL].
229. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066.
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the price of drugs purchased for Medicare beneficiaries, despite the
fact that the sheer volume of drugs purchased and other factors give
the government a strong bargaining position. Drug pricing under
the new Part D benefit is worked out between private insurance
companies sponsoring the drug benefit 23 0 and pharmaceutical
manufacturers. Specifically, the MMA provides:
In order to promote competition under this part and in
carrying out this part, the Secretary-(1) may not interfere
with the negotiations between drug manufacturers and
pharmacies and [prescription drug plan] sponsors; and (2) may
not require a particular formulary or institute a price
231
structure for the reimbursement of covered Part D drugs.
The decision under MMA to give free rein on prescription drug
pricing to the pharmaceutical and insurance industries drew strong
public objection and accusations that the lawmakers drafting the
232MMA were "captured" by politically powerful lobbying groups.
Although such criticism may be overstated, the MMA contains not
merely a loophole but an open invitation for pricing abuses.
Regulations implementing the new Part D prescription drug benefit
took effect on March 22, 2005, and the drug pricing issue promises
230. These are referred to as Pharmacy Benefits Managers or "PBMs." See
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003
§ 303.
231. Id. § 101 (describing "noninterference").
232. See, e.g., Ceci Connolly, New Drug Law's Cost Impact Debated; Some
Question Whether Insurance Companies Will Get Lower Prices, WASH. POST,
Apr. 9, 2004, at A3 (noting that the government could have cut drug costs in
half by using its purchasing power to negotiate lower prices, the way the VA
does, and quoting Senator Edward Kennedy as stating, "[tihe single most
irresponsible provision in the Medicare bill is the prohibition that prevents
Medicare from negotiating lower-priced prescription drugs"); Editorial, Give
Medicare Power to Bargain on Drug Costs, TENNESSEAN, Jan. 12, 2004, at 6A
("The anti-bargaining provision only makes sense from the perspective of
pharmaceutical makers, who want full price for their wares, or private health-
care companies, that will now have a competitive edge against Medicare.");
Judith A. Stein, Don't Give Medicare Away to Private Plans, HARTFORD
COURANT, Feb. 10, 2004, at A9 (noting that the "new Medicare law includes
another certain prescription for skyrocketing costs. Adding insult to injury, it
explicitly prohibits the government from negotiating discounted prices with
pharmaceutical companies on behalf of the 41 million Medicare beneficiaries.");
John O'Neil, Medi-SCARE, NEA TODAY, Mar. 1, 2004, at 34 (listing among the
problems in the new law, "[nlo controls on runaway drug costs .... [I]n the face
of fierce lobbying by the drug industry, the new law specifically forbade the
federal government from negotiating with suppliers to rein in drug costs.").
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to remain a central point of controversy as the program takes
effect.
33
Past experience with drug pricing under government health
care programs suggests that lawmakers' current acquiescence to the
industry's price setting may not persist. Regulators responded to
public pressure and attacked the AWP loophole through price
reviews and threatened enforcement action, despite any clear
authority to regulate drug prices. Under Medicare Part B,
pharmacies and other suppliers received the lower of billed charges
or ninety-five percent of the AWP.234 Under Medicaid, most states. 235
reimburse pharmacies the AWP, less a percentage discount.
Although the government lacks clear authority to regulate charges,
it nevertheless scrutinized and threatened sanctions against
providers for alleged prescription drug overcharges.236
CMS recently conducted a nationwide review of pharmacy
pricing and concluded that the Medicare and Medicaid programs
were being significantly overcharged for prescription drugs because
the AWP is not the actual price that pharmacies pay for drugs.237
233. See Medicare Program: Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit, 70 Fed.
Reg. 4194 (Jan. 28, 2005) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 400, 403, 411, 417,
423).
234. 42 C.F.R. § 405.517(b) (2004) (explaining the payment for drugs and
biologics are not paid on a cost or prospective payment basis). Medicare Part B
provided limited prescription drug coverage for certain drugs and biologics
furnished to outpatients, e.g., clotting agents for hemophilia, Social Security Act
§ 1861(s)(2)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(s)(2)(I) (2000); immunosuppressive drugs for
organ transplant recipients, Social Security Act § 1861(s)(2)(J), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395x(s)(2)(J); oral cancer chemotherapy drugs, Social Security Act
§§ 1861(s)(2)(Q), (t)(2), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395x(s)(2)(Q), (t)(2); hepatitis B vaccines
for certain individuals, Social Security Act § 1861(s)(2)(V)(10)(B), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395x(s)(2)(V)(10)(B); and flu vaccines furnished under state law, CARRIERS
MANUAL, supra note 228, § 2049(4)(B)(3). See also 42 C.F.R. § 419.64(d) (2004)
(stating that outpatient reimbursement is ninety-five percent of AWP minus the
ambulatory payment classification ("APC") amount). Under the Medicare
outpatient prospective payment system ("OPPS"), APCs are fixed payment
categories analogous to DRGs under inpatient PPS. See id. § 419.31.
235. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., MEDICAID PHARMACY-AcTuAL ACQUISITION COST OF GENERIC
PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRODUCTS, REP. No. A-06-01-00053 (2002) [hereinafter
HHS, GENERIC] (describing prescription drug reimbursement under states'
Medicaid programs); see also U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., MEDICAID PHARMACY-ACTUAL ACQUISITION COST OF BRAND
NAME PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRODUCTS, REP. No. A-06-00-00023 (2001)
[hereinafter HHS, BRAND NAME] (describing prescription drug reimbursement
under states' Medicaid programs).
236. See supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing CMS's authority to regulate charges).
237. See generally HHS, GENERIC, supra note 235; HHS, BRAND NAME, supra
note 235; see also Medicare Payments for Currently Covered Prescription Drugs:
[Vol. 401262
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The AWP is the pharmaceutical manufacturer's "list price" for the
drug, similar to a hospital's list price or full charges for medical
treatment. But like hospitals, drug manufacturers typically offer
discounts to certain buyers, such as pharmacies and other wholesale
238purchasers. 8 As a result, the only purchaser being charged the full
AWP or list price for drugs was the government. The government
alleged that manufacturers' "manipulation of AWPs" caused the
significant overpayments and, accordingly, sought to bring
reimbursement levels "more in line with the actual acquisition
costs."
23 9
CMS further suggested that the practice of inflating AWPs for
purposes of increasing government health care program
reimbursement could be actionable under the federal civil False
Claims Act ("FCA"). 24 ° Medicare-participating hospitals are aware of
the high stakes for exploiting loopholes, even if the conduct is not
clearly prohibited. Medicare regulators previously have turned to
the FCA and other laws to sanction conduct that previously seemed
tacitly, if not openly, acceptable but later became an enforcement
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,
107th Cong. 9-13 (2002) (statement of CMS Administrator Thomas A. Scully
regarding Part B overpayment for drugs).
238. See generally HHS, BRAND NAME, supra note 235.
239. HHS, GENERIC, supra note 235, App. 3 (reprinting CMS Administrator
Scully's letter to Inspector General Janet Rehnquist); see also U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., MEDICAID PHARMACY-
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES OF THE ACTUAL ACQUISITION COST OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG
PRODUCTS, REP. No. A-06-02-00041 (2002) (proposing a four-tiered
reimbursement methodology). As with the outlier formula, the potential for
providers to increase drug reimbursement levels by increasing charges was not
a new revelation for federal regulators. As early as 1975, the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") attempted to control Medicare and
Medicaid drug costs, under the Maximum Allowable Cost initiative. See Limits
on Payments for Drugs, 40 Fed. Reg. 34,512, 34,516 (Aug. 15, 1975);
Limitations on Payment or Reimbursement for Drugs, 40 Fed. Reg. 32,283,
32,284 (July 31, 1975).
240. See Draft OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers, 67 Fed. Reg. 62,057, 62,060 (Oct. 3, 2002) (explaining that the
federal government sets reimbursement rates for pharmaceuticals "with the
expectation that the data provided are complete and accurate," that
manufacturers' reported prices "should accurately take into account price
reductions, rebates, up-front payments, coupons, goods in kind, free or reduced
price services, grants or other price concessions or similar benefits offered to
some or all purchasers," and that submission of "false, fraudulent, or misleading
information" is actionable under the False Claims Act). The False Claims Act
prohibits knowingly presenting or causing to be presented to the federal
government a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval. See 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a)(1) (2000).
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priority.24' The FCA carries steep sanctions, including treble
damages and civil monetary penalties up to $11,000 per claim,242
meaning each individual patient record, of which there could be
thousands for a particular medical provider.243
Similar to the AWP issue, the government could employ a
strategy of accusation and innuendo to rein in hospital charges
under the Medicare outlier payment initiative.244  Specifically,
enforcement authorities could allege that hospital charge structures
are grossly inflated and bear no relation to the actual prices that
commercial insurers and others pay for inpatient services and
supplies. Then, they could allege that claims for Medicare outlier
bonus payments based on inflated charges amount to a false claim
in violation of the FCA. Despite the lack of authority over hospital
charges and a historical policy of noninterference toward hospital
administration, federal authorities could resort to the open-ended
language of FCA to sanction perceived abuses under the Medicare
outlier adjustment. 24 In light of those possibilities, health care
providers may weigh the risks associated with the loophole heavily
and alter otherwise beneficial pricing and other business strategies
to avoid the potentially steep monetary and reputational sanctions.
Before regulators embark on a campaign of closing Medicare
loopholes, including the outlier adjustment, the collateral economic
effects of stifling private market competition and innovation should
be considered. The dual government and private health care
delivery systems are not coordinated and may offer competing
incentives. The current trend in health care reform is to increase
reliance on privatization, competition, and market-based strategies
as ways of reducing costs and improving quality and efficiency.
Therefore, it is especially important that regulators implement any
241. See Hyman, supra note 225, at 550-52 (discussing problems of
"speakeasy" enforcement of health care fraud and abuse under an over
inclusive, highly indeterminate FCA provision).
242. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) (listing civil monetary penalties under the FCA);
42 C.F.R. § 1003.103(c) (2004) (stating that the "OIG may impose a penalty of
not more than $11,000 for each payment for which there was a failure to report
required information") (footnote omitted).
243. See Hyman, supra note 225, at 536 (noting that "[blecause most health
care providers typically submit a large number of modest claims, this structure
means that statutory penalties generally dwarf actual damages and quickly rise
to staggering levels"); Jost & Davies, supra note 131, at 247-48 (noting that
"[h]ealth care providers tend to file large numbers of small claims, often
amounting to thousands of claims over the course of a year" and that
"penalties... can literally run into hundreds of millions of dollars").
244. See While & Lee, supra note 114 (quoting CMS Administrator Scully:
"If you have true costs, great. If not, we are going to come looking for you.").
245. See supra notes 240-43 and accompanying text.
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changes to the Medicare program only after fully considering the
risks posed by historical loopholes and secondary effects of closing
them on both the overall regulatory scheme and private market. In
Tenet's case, CMS's Medicare outlier initiative deterred potentially
innovative market strategies that might have provided useful
guidance in forthcoming health care policy discussions.
V. ANALYSIS
In the current health care environment of declining
reimbursement and rising costs, hospitals-and not just for-profit
hospitals like Tenet, but also non-profit, community, and teaching
hospitals-look for ways to offset losses in losing cost centers by
increasing revenue or reimbursement in other areas. "Cost-shifting"
is standard operating procedure for hospitals in the current health
care market squeeze. Accordingly, hospitals may identify regulatory
incentives, including loopholes, as potentially lucrative sources of
additional income.
The easy answer to the problem of Medicare loopholes is simply
to close them and thereby eliminate the temptation. But loopholes
are inevitable and pervasive in complex regulatory schemes like the
tax code and Medicare reimbursement methodology. 46 Regulators
may lack resources to quickly spot and close the loopholes. On the
other hand, regulators may be fully aware of loopholes but may
rationally weigh the costs and benefits of closing the loopholes and
make a conscious choice not to leave them open, as occurred for
many years with the Medicare outlier payment formula. But public
pressure or concern over "cheating" may cause regulators to re-
prioritize and reconsider settled issues.24" The standard approach to
closing loopholes through statutory or regulatory amendment may
be slow or cumbersome because formal legislative or administrative
channels must be navigated. Public pressure for speedy response
may drive regulators to employ shortcuts and informal methods of
tightening loopholes or otherwise addressing the Medicare
"pollutant of the month."248 In addition, the impatient public may
246. Editorial, See The Real Tenet Scandal, supra note 2 (regarding the
inevitability of loopholes in Medicare regulatory system). Cf Uwe E.
Reinhardt, Medicare Can Turn Anyone Into a Crook, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2000,
at A18 (noting the "unrivaled" regulatory complexity of the Medicare program
and tendency of "spooked" hospital executives to cave to enforcement actions
rather than litigate).
247. See Hyman, supra note 225, at 550 (observing that "when
administrative priorities change, conduct that everyone in the industry thought
was acceptable can suddenly become exhibit A in a criminal and civil case").
248. "In the context of environmental legislation, it encourages the well-
known 'pollutant of the month' syndrome, where regulation is driven by recent
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not wait for official response, applying a range of informal sanctions
against identified wrongdoers.4 9  Social norms and informal
sanctions, in some cases, may compliment government
enforcement. 250 But those approaches more often will lead to over-
deterrence or misguided responses by the sanctioned actors.
Without the deliberative, albeit slow, process that characterizes
administrative policy changes, society's attempted "cure" may be
much more harmful than the perceived "cancer" sought to be
eliminated.
A. Gauging the Cost of Loopholes
The Medicare program, by design, contains payment incentives
directing health care providers' operations.25' For example, in
implementing inpatient PPS, regulators intended providers to limit
unnecessary services and inflationary spending. Moreover, by
restricting payment for inpatient care under PPS, while outpatient
and memorable instances of harm." Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach, supra
note 4, at 1518 (regarding anecdote-driven environment legislation and noting
that reliance on "how 'available' other instances of the harm in question are" is
a fully rational judgment error that nevertheless can lead to systemic errors);
see also Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 691-701 (discussing the Love Canal,
Alar pesticide, and other examples).
249. Decentralized enforcement through social norms may offer a faster,
more responsive approach than centralized enforcement to police private
conduct. See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The
Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1643, 1655 (1996) (describing alternative views that social norms are either
hard to change because a procedure for reform does not exist or easy to change
because reform does not require formal procedures). Cf. Eric A. Posner, Law,
Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1700-01 (1996)
(refuting the notion that decentralized rulemaking is more effective and
streamlined than centralized rulemaking).
250. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHouT LAw 127 (1991) (describing
norms as rules emanating from social forces and laws as rules emanating from
government); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation
of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 340 (1997) (defining norms as "informal social
regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized
sense of duty, because of fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both"); Richard
A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special
Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 369, 369 (1999) (providing
examples, including table manners, grammar rules, country club regulations,
standard business practices, and lying, which may be independent of, or overlap
with, laws).
251. See Jost & Davies, supra note 131, at 250 (noting that "payment
systems unavoidably provide incentives for certain kinds of provider behavior-
for example, the provision, of more, or of higher quality, or of more cost-effective
health care goods and services. Payment systems are often consciously
designed to promote such goals.").
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care remained under the old, potentially more lucrative cost-based
reimbursement program, regulators intended for hospitals to divert
resources to outpatient treatment.252 Responding to that incentive,
hospitals closed some acute care inpatient units and opened new,
long-term care units, which were reimbursed as outpatient
253
services.
Since PPS implementation, providers have identified various
unintended incentives, or loopholes, to increase Medicare
reimbursement under the fixed DRG payments.5 For example,
providers quickly recognized that by "upcoding," or classifying
patients' conditions as more complex or acute than medically
indicated, they could collect higher DRG payment amounts.255 The
252. See Stephenson v. Shalala, 87 F.3d 350, 355 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that
after inpatient PPS implementation "permitting outpatient charges to rise is
consistent with Congress' goal of encouraging a diversion of resources toward
outpatient treatment .... By increasing the rate of return to outpatient vis-h-vis
inpatient procedures, Congress effectively increased the incentive to supply
outpatient services.").
253. See Theodore M. McDowell, Jr., Physician Self Referral Arrangements:
Legitimate Business or Unethical "Entrepreneurialism", 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 61,
64 (1989) (noting that providers responded to PPS implementation by shifting
services to non-hospital settings). Cf George Anders, A Plan to Cut Back On
Medicare Expenses Goes Awry; Costs Soar: Hospitals Rush to Remodel To Offer
Subacute Care -And Get Paid Twice, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 1996, at Al, reprinted
in ROSENBLAWr ET AL, supra note 132, at 486-87 (suggesting that "incomplete
and imperfect efforts to contain [Medicare] costs" fall on elderly and disabled
because hospitals identify alternative reimbursement strategies rather than
reduce costs).
254. As one commentator summarized:
Health-care providers have been gaming Medicare since that federal
insurance program evolved into a system of Soviet-style price controls
in the 1980s. Medicare pays a fixed amount for a treatment,
regardless of costs, and in turn companies search for loopholes in the
system's 100,000 pages of regulations to make up the difference.
Sooner or later Medicare discovers the "loophole," closes it and the
cycle starts all over.
Editorial, The Real Tenet Scandal, supra note 2, at A14; see also Editorial,
Tenet's Shareholder Ills, supra note 2, at A10 ("As we've said before, Tenet's
mistake wasn't in getting what it could from Medicare loopholes, but that it
didn't let shareholders know that the windfall couldn't last."). See generally
Richard M. Cooper, Objectionable Conduct, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 20, 2003, at 16
(noting that "fmiarket forces respond to incentives; and in virtually all markets,
even the unlawful ones, the government significantly affects the incentives to
which buyers and sellers respond" and discussing regulatory incentives in
Medicare prescription drug reimbursement policy). Cf Hyman, supra note 225,
at 542 (suggesting that, under cost-contained health care payment systems,
physicians may believe that the only way to provide high-quality care is to
manipulate reimbursement rules).
255. See, e.g., David Wessel, Medicare Cures: Easy to Prescribe, Tricky to
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Medicare outlier adjustment was another incentive built into PPS
regulatory framework. Day outlier payments created an incentive to
keep patients in the hospital extra days. Cost outlier payments also
created incentives-an intended incentive to treat the sickest and
most needy Medicare patients and an unintended incentive for
charge inflation.
As a matter of basic microeconomics, perhaps none of those
strategies was unexpected or irrational. In each instance, hospitals
were acting as rational profit-maximizing firms. But as a normative
matter, many of us would consider at least some of the conduct
objectionable. 256 Practices such as upcoding or extending lengths of
stay may be consistent with individual wealth maximization but
may misallocate societal resources if a provider receives
reimbursement that greatly exceeds the actual costs of caring for the
patient. The Medicare program is supported by a limited pool of
federal funds, derived from general revenue and federal payroll tax,
Predict, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2003, at Al (describing a pneumonia upcoding
probe to crack-down on improper coding of "high-risk pneumonia" and reporting
that a 1993 government study of 17,000 pneumonia cases found that only 3.3%
were classified as "low-risk," a much lower figure than medical evidence
suggests); see also supra note 80 and accompanying text (describing Tenet's
settlement of pneumonia upcoding charge settlement). Several other strategies
have been the focus of government enforcement initiatives, such as "Operation
Bad Bundle," which targeted hospitals' attempts to collect higher
reimbursement for certain laboratory tests by billing the tests individually, or
"unbundled," rather than as a panel or "bundle" of tests as required by
regulations. The Physicians at Teaching Hospitals ("PATH") audits, targeted
improper billing for services provided by supervising physicians at academic
medical centers. The "72-Hour DRG Payment Window" initiative involves a
Medicare regulation that requires hospitals to include services furnished to
inpatients within seventy-two hours before or after admission as part of the
bundled DRG payment, rather than billing separately for hospital outpatient
services. Another DRG-related issue involves billing hospital transfers as
discharges so that each hospital receives the full DRG amount. Medicare
regulations provide that only the transferee hospital receives the DRG
payment, while the transferring hospital receives a per-diem amount. See
Hyman, supra note 225, at 555 (listing OIG enforcement initiatives aimed at
hospital billing practices); Jost & Davies, supra note 131, at 255-57 (describing
national health care fraud and abuse enforcement initiatives).
256. See, e.g., Said, supra note 77, at Al (describing a health care analyst as
saying, "I don't know any other way to put it. They [Tenet] have a duty not to
manipulate their strategies to game the system. They just did not act as good
corporate citizens."). But see Jost & Davies, supra note 131, at 254 (describing a
continuum of "beneficial to inexcusable" provider responses to incentives in
government health care programs and identifying upcoding as an "enthusiastic"
response to incentives, i.e., "responses that the designers of the incentive
system perhaps did not contemplate, but they are not yet beyond the bounds of
either reasonableness or manageability").
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with some additional contributions by Medicare beneficiaries in the
257form of premiums, deductibles, and copayments. But the pooi of
funds is largely fixed, meaning that excessive payments to one
participating provider deplete funds available to pay other
providers. Federal dollars account for almost one-third of health
care providers' income. 258  Providers that lose out to loophole
exploiters may be forced to close their operations, potentially
endangering the overall availability of health care services.
Moreover, taxpayers face increased tax burdens if the government
has to generate additional dollars to maintain existing Medicare
enrollment and benefit levels. Therefore, basic fairness, fiscal
concerns, and market practicalities suggest some need to police
loopholes, even if the conduct is not clearly unlawful.
Under traditional principles of profit-maximization, firms will
cheat as long as it is economically efficient to do so; that is, as long
as the potential gains from cheating outweigh the potential risks.259
Potential gains might include capturing a market advantage or
remaining competitive in a tight market.26° Potential risks include
257. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i, 1395s (2000).
258. See OIG Statement, supra note 12 (citing statistics regarding
government health care purchasing).
259. See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an
Evolving Health Care Marketplace: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM.
J.L. & MED. 205, 218 (1996) (noting that illegal conduct is "rampant and
countenanced by law enforcement officials because" fraud and abuse laws and
enforcement are "so out of sync with the conventional norms and realities of the
marketplace"); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Accounting for Greed: Unraveling the
Rogue Trader Mystery, 79 OR. L. REV. 301, 308-09 (2000) (discussing incentives
and observing that traders' motivations to hide losses and fabricate profits "are
so great that to fail to attempt such evasion is arguably irrational"); Cooper,
supra note 254, at 16 (noting that where the "risk of detection of improper
conduct or of strong enforcement action against it appears to be small,
competitors will cheat, even at some risk of running afoul of laws with
substantial penalties"); see also Eric A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Greed, 151
U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1122 (2002) (noting that "[g]reed is a problem for the state
because greedy people are too hard to control" because they are "either so myopic
and extreme that they do not care about legal sanctions, or they are so cold and
calculating that they exploit all legal loopholes to their own benefit and to the
harm of others"). Cf Jost & Davies, supra note 131, at 268 (noting that
complete deterrence requires a penalty that equals or exceeds any potential
gain from wrongful conduct); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning,
and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 349 (1997) (noting that standard economic
conception of deterrence assumes that "[ilndividuals commit crimes . . . when
the expected utility of law-breaking exceeds the expected disutility of
punishment").
260. See Krawiec, supra note 259, at 335 (concluding that "market forces will
not eliminate rouge trading" because self-interested trading benefits traders,
management, and, to some extent, shareholders); Cooper, supra note 254, at 16
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formal and informal sanctions. Therefore, even if certain business
strategies or conduct are not actually unlawful, firms may recognize
efficiency or other rational economic reasons to resist regulatory
loopholes. Society may impose informal sanctions against conduct
that violates widely held values, beliefs, or norms, including
standards of fairness and morality.26' Informal sanctions include
guilt, shame, stigmatization, gossip, ostracism, disapproval,
contrition, and vengeance.262 The government may impose legal
sanctions, including fines, incarceration, and, in the Medicare
context, exclusion from participation in government health care
programs.262 But lack of coordination among official and unofficial
"regulators" may lead to under-enforcement, with the questionable
conduct going unchecked. Alternatively, over-zealous enforcement
may deter competition and produce inefficient responses by
("In current circumstances, companies competing in the market have to choose
either to exceed the limits or suffer a competitive disadvantage.").
261. See Posner, supra note 249, at 1720 (discussing morality and norms
that "reflect nonefficiency and, more generally, non-consequentialist values");
see, e.g., Kahan, supra note 259, at 357-59 (noting that "individuals tend to
adapt their moral convictions to those of their peers" and are more likely to
violate or evade laws if they perceive their peers are doing so). See generally
Posner, supra note 259, at 1099-1102 (distinguishing "self-interest," in
consumer choice theory, from "greed," which describes "excessive bodily
appetites or an excessive longing for purchasing power" and "carries with it a
moral charge").
262. See ELLICKSON, supra note 250, 213-19 (outlining gradual escalation of
force against norm violators, from notice, to gossip, to physical seizure and
destruction of measured amount of deviant's assets); Cooter, supra note 249, at
1668-69 ("Informal sanctions like gossip and ostracism are cheap pain" which
"increase the expected cost of violating the norm, which increases conformity to
it."); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
591, 631-49 (1996) (listing and discussing various shaming penalties); Posner &
Rasmusen, supra note 250, at 370-72 (describing six types of sanctions for
violating norms, including automatic sanctions, guilt, shame, informational
sanctions, bilateral costly sanctions, and multilateral costly sanctions); see also
John B. Owens, Have We No Shame?: Thoughts on Shaming, "White Collar"
Criminals, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1047,
1047-53 (2000) (evaluating Kahan's arguments in favor of "shaming" sanctions
for white collar criminals).
263. Kahan, supra note 262, at 591 (listing forms of punishment for violating
laws and noting overwhelming societal preference for incarceration); Posner,
supra note 249, at 1699 (defining a "norm" as "a rule that distinguishes
desirable and undesirable behavior and gives a third party the authority to
punish a person who engages in the undesirable behavior" and noting that "a
private person sanctions the norm violator, whereas a state actor sanctions the
law violator"); Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 250, at 369-70 (noting further
that public institutions use "well-defined deliberative" processes to promulgate
laws, and states' enforcement ultimately carries a "threat of violence").
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regulated firms." In theory, a combination of formal and informal
sanctions could provide an effective strategy for policing complex,
regulated industries, such as the American health care market.265
Industry insiders or competitors may be better or faster at
identifying problems and imposing sanctions than government
regulators.266 Moreover, regulators may be entrenched or impeded
by bureaucratic red tape, factors which hamper their ability to
effectively or quickly address changing industry practices and close
problematic loopholes.
Without waiting on formal action by regulators, the public
responded to the Weakley report identifying the outlier issue by
imposing informal sanctions, including shaming, gossip, ostracism,
and disapproval on Tenet. News reports and commentators cited
Tenet's questionable practices, explained (often erroneously) the
correlation between charges and outlier payments, and questioned
264. See Cooper, supra note 254, at 16 ("Sometimes, even objectionable
conduct simply should be tolerated . . . ."); Posner, supra note 249, at 1708
(noting, in variant of Coase's theorem, that inefficient laws may be superseded
by efficient norms, "transferring the entitlement to the party who values it
most"); id. at 1728-29 (discussing strategies for eliminating inefficient norms by
creating incentives for violating them); Posner, supra note 259, at 1132
(describing the role of judges in condemning "socially valuable if unsavory"
behavior and "sow[ing] confusion for litigants and the public"); Posner &
Rasmusen, supra note 250, at 380-81 (discussing interplay of government
sanctions and norms and noting "that government should be careful about
interfering with norm sanctions. Sometimes just staying out of the way is the
best policy.").
265. See ELLICKSON, supra note 250, at 5-6 (discussing pervasiveness of
social norms and noting that "[pleople may supplement, and indeed preempt,
the state's rules with rules of their own"); Kahan, supra note 262, at 593
(describing the ways that alternative sanctions may complement traditional
criminal punishments, such as imprisonment and fines); Posner & Rasmusen,
supra note 250, at 380 (suggesting that norms may be "more important than
laws in deterring theft"); see also Krawiec, supra note 259, at 332-33 (describing
the process of norm creation and role of "norm entrepreneurs" and summarizing
Ellickson's view that a new norm arises with an individual change agent);
Posner, supra note 249, at 1708 ("Norms are usually enforced not just by the
victim, but by third parties, such as the local villagers who impose sanctions
(gossip, ostracism) on those who break the rules."); Posner & Rasmusen, supra
note 250, at 379 (regarding norm innovators and other influences on norm
enforcement).
266. See ELLICKSON, supra note 250, at 177 (identifying characteristics of
close-knit groups that tend to promote efficient norm production, including
possessing information about norms and violations, reciprocal power, and ready
sanctioning opportunities); see also Cooter, supra note 249, at 1643-47
(introducing a theory of decentralized law, "which percolates up from the
bottom"); Krawiec, supra note 259, at 325-32 (describing the development of
financial traders' norms).
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the company's morality.267 Potential merger partners and investors
grew wary. Tenet's own shareholders perpetuated the shaming and
gossip by gathering to discuss the company's wrongdoing.
Compromising their own portfolio values, the shareholders
published a report tabulating Tenet's potential liability for health
care fraud at $6 billion.268 As a consequence, investors dumped their
shares, resulting in additional informal sanctions in the form of
ostracism and refusal to do business.
After years of declining to police the outlier loophole or hospital
charges, CMS responded to the post-Enron public pressure to
crackdown on corporate "cheating." The agency reprioritized its
enforcement agenda and initiated investigations of previously
overlooked practices.269 Aiming to act quickly, the government relied
on many of the same informal sanctions that the public had already
begun imposing. For example, CMS and Congress perpetuated the
gossip and stigma on Tenet and other providers suspected of
collecting high outlier payments by issuing strongly worded press
releases and memoranda listing suspect factors for outlier abuse,
publishing names of possible offenders, and initiating informal
audits and investigations. The government possesses additional
enforcement methods unavailable to the public including civil fines
and other formal sanctions for perceived outlier abuses. Although
the government's authority to regulate hospital administration and
charging practices is questionable,27 ° providers took the threats
seriously, knowing the agency's precedent for broadly interpreting
the FCA to bring enforcement actions and potentially steep
sanctions, including fines and program exclusion. 1
267. See generally Laura B. Benko, On the Lookout; CMS Studies Outlier
Billing Practices, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Dec. 9, 2002, at 14.
268. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (describing a meeting that
estimated liability at $6 billion). Cf Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Should the
Behavior of Top Management Matter?, 91 GEO. L.J. 1215, 1223 (2003)
(suggesting that "corporate liability seems, on some level, unfair because it
reduces the wealth of shareholders who themselves have rarely done anything
wrong directly"); Editorial, Tenet's Shareholder Ills, supra note 2, at A10
("Tenet Healthcare presented a shiny red apple to Medicare on Monday, hoping
to get back in teacher's good graces. Too bad the fruit came from its
shareholders' tree.").
269. See Hyman, supra note 225, at 550 (observing that "when
administrative priorities change, conduct that everyone in the industry thought
was acceptable can suddenly become exhibit A in a criminal and civil case").
270. See supra part IV.B.1 (discussing CMS's authority, or lack thereof,
regarding health care providers' and suppliers' pricing).
271. Program exclusion results in loss of all Medicare revenue and
publication of the excluded providers' names in the Federal Register. See supra
notes 240-43 and accompanying text (discussing regulators' use of FCA to
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Faced with persistent non-legal sanctions and credible threats
of costly legal sanctions, Tenet took various steps to dispel the
negative attention. Tenet's response included press releases, Web
site postings, and media interviews. 272 At first, the company denied
any wrongdoing with respect to outliers but later expressed
contrition and overhauled its corporate policies and practices.273
Specifically, Tenet attempted to reduce stigma and restore investor
confidence by self-auditing its Medicare claims, restructuring
management, and revamping pricing policies and outlier
computation methodologies.274
As a rational corporate actor, Tenet weighed the suddenly
increased potential costs of taking advantage of the outlier loophole
against the benefits and reacted accordingly. However, after the
Enron dust settled, it appears that Tenet may have overreacted and
self-policed itself into a marginal market position. Ultimately,
Tenet might have brought outlier payments in line with agency
rules and guidance through corrective measures less debilitating
than the concessions and changes that the public demanded through
informal sanctions. Enron and other readily available examples of
corporate cheating and "creative accounting" caused the public to
misperceive the threat posed by the Medicare outlier loophole. The
changes eventually implemented through formal amendment to the
outlier regulations were not as radical or detrimental to providers'
operations than the changes driven by informal sanctions, self-
policing, and other fast-track regulatory initiatives. Had regulators
been insulated from the public's emotional reaction and retributive
desires, the agency could have conducted rational, deliberative
corporate reform, preserving Tenet as a useful model for efficient,
private, market health-care delivery.
B. Costly Availability Errors
Public reaction to news of Tenet's disproportionately high
outlier payments produced costly availability errors similar to the
effects described in other regulatory contexts.275 Just as the public
sanction excess prescription drug prices).
272. See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 99; Interview by Cory Johnson,
CNBC correspondent, with Trevor Feter, President and CEO of Tenet
Healthcare (Sept. 17, 2003).
273. See Press Release, supra note 99.
274. See Tenet's Shareholder Ills, supra note 2, at A10.
275. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 691-703 (describing the Love
Canal, Alar pesticide, and TWA Flight 800 episodes and regulatory responses);
see also Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach, supra note 4, at 1518-22 (describing
anecdote-driven environmental legislation, with special reference to
Superfund).
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latched onto the Love Canal example to conclude that hazardous
waste sites represented the nation's top environmental problem-
above pesticides, smoking tobacco, water pollution, work-site
chemicals and other threats_76-the public latched onto the outlier
loophole and for-profit medicine as the major flaw in the American
health care system, rather than a whole host of other problems.
Moreover, just as in the environmental context, consumers,
investors, and the media failed to understand the range of factors,
incentives, and risks associated with the complex regulatory
scheme. The public did not comprehend the intricate Medicare
reimbursement methodology or the carefully balanced regulatory
and private market incentives underlying hospital pricing and other
business operations. Drawing on widely publicized examples
outside of the health care context such as Enron, Adelphia, and
HealthSouth, the public pushed regulators to close the Medicare
outlier loophole. 7 The enforcement program drew resources away
from other priorities and concerns to a relatively minor wrinkle in
the reimbursement methodology, of which regulators were well
aware and had repeatedly and rationally declined to iron out.
Until the fall of 2001, Tenet rationally could have concluded
that the potential exposure for targeting Medicare outlier payments
was relatively low, even as a part of a deliberate strategy rather
than just fortunately tapping into that revenue stream through
robust pricing and product differentiation. Medicare authorities had
repeatedly acknowledged the flaws in the outlier formula. They
knew that hospitals could and were increasing outlier claims by
increasing hospital charges. However, regulators expressly declined
to impose sanctions or close the outlier loophole. 8 In 2002, Kenneth
Weakley first identified the correlation between Tenet's hospital
charges and Medicare outlier payments. Weakley served as an
"availability entrepreneur," offering the outlier formula as a ready
explanation for Tenet's unusually high profits.27 9 The media and the
public, lacking independent understanding of hospital pricing and
Medicare payments, readily adopted and perpetuated Weakley's
explanation initiating a cascade effect.
The public failed to independently review relevant information
before passing judgment and signaling others to adopt the same
view. At Weakley's suggestion, the public focused its disapproval on
276. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 696-98 (describing the public's
persistent misperception regarding the threat posed by toxic waste sites,
compared to other environmental risks).
277. See Ribstein, supra note 8, at 2.
278. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
279. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 687-88.
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Tenet's high prices and the outlier formula. Highly publicized
lawsuits and news reports regarding hospitals charging full list
prices and sending collection agents after indigent patients
confirmed skeptics' worst fears about for-profit "cowboy" medicine.
In the post-Enron climate, the public scrutinized aggressive
competitive strategies and unusually high profits for alternative
explanations. In Tenet's case, the outlier loophole was as good an
explanation as any other. But the public's visceral, emotional
reaction was based on an incomplete understanding of the Medicare
reimbursement methodology and the government's historical
noninterference policy, not to mention the complex interplay of
private market incentives. The availability cascade that Weakley's
report initiated, the media stoked, and the public carried forward,
produced widespread availability errors.
First, the public did not comprehend the pressures driving
health care pricing. In the current managed care era, hospital
charges, or list prices, bear little relevance to how either private
insurers or the government pay for health care services provided to
their enrollees. Private insurance companies typically negotiate
fixed, prospective, bundled, or otherwise discounted payments with
hospitals. Charges serve as a reference point for negotiating the
discounts or payment structures and, to that extent, reflect what the
market will bear. Likewise, government health care programs use
special payment methodologies-such as PPS based on DRGs-that
are largely divorced from actual costs or charges. 20 As a result, the
only patients left exposed to full, non-discounted prices are the self-
insured and uninsured. At the surface, the idea of the government
and private insurance companies negotiating steep discounts while
indigent patients are saddled with full charges seems to be the
height of callous private market greed.
But the public failed to understand the Medicare regulations
driving Tenet and other hospitals to increase charges and undertake
to actually collect payment from indigent patients. In particular,
Medicare uniform charges and other cost reimbursement principles,
combined with the outlier loophole, created the incentive. 28 ' Nothing
in the Medicare program rules prevented Tenet from increasing
charges. Moreover, the government lacks authority to interfere with
hospital administration, including pricing.8 2 In addition, hospital
280. See FuRROW, supra note 137, at 574.
281. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text (explaining regulations
requiring hospitals to establish uniform charges for all payors and using
"charges actually imposed" or "collected" as the basis for Medicare
reimbursement).
282. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text (citing the statute and
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administrators understood that offering discounts or sliding-scale
fees to uninsured patients could violate Medicare "uniform charges"
rules and invite potentially steep FCA sanctions.283 For charges to
be considered "actual charges" for purposes of calculating Medicare
payment for outliers and other cost-based adjustments under PPS,
hospital administrators rationally believed that they actually had to
attempt to collect payment from patients. CMS recently issued
guidance rebutting that interpretation of the regulations, but the
view had been widely accepted in the industry.284
Hospitals, such as those owned by Tenet, rationally responded
to the regulatory incentives in establishing their charge structures.
Because charges are largely irrelevant for determining private or
government reimbursement, there was no market or regulatory
consequence for increasing charges, even if those prices were
inflated or fictional. List prices could be super-competitive with no
associated decline in demand because no one was actually paying
list prices. Contrary to the public's perceptions, Tenet's pricing
strategy was not a clear example of naked greed, "turbocharging," or
price gouging. A complex mix of private market and regulatory
factors created incentives for Tenet's strong and robust charges.
Nevertheless, under pressure of informal sanctions and agency audit
and enforcement activity, Tenet voluntarily altered various business
strategies and internal policies, including its price structure and
outlier calculation. The damages compromised the company's
market advantage and contravened other Medicare rules and
policies.285
Another judgment error that the public and media perpetuated
describing the traditional non-interference policy).
283. Offering discounts, in particular, could also be considered "illegal
remuneration" offered to induce a patient referral under the anti-kickback
statute, if the patient was a federal health care program enrollee. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a-7b (2000). But because the indigent patients in question generally had
no form of health insurance, including government insurance, this statute likely
would not be implicated.
284. CMS addressed the uninsured charges issue through informal policy
statements, rather than formal amendments, because the agency believed the
statements reflected the existing rules, not a rule change. See supra note 221
and accompanying text.
285. In addition to arguably violating the uniform charges principle by
discounting prices to uninsured patients, Tenet's voluntary outlier formula
modifications arguably violate the rule that only Medicare FIs have authority to
revise a provider-specific RCC. See supra note 167. Federal regulations
expressly require FIs-not providers-to calculate the provider-specific RCCs
annually. Until recently, there was no allowance for mid-year updates,
adjustments, or provisions for using data from tentative or non-final cost
reports. 42 C.F.R. § 412.84(h) (2004).
[Vol. 401276
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was the repeated criticism that Tenet collected a "disproportionate"
share of Medicare outlier payments.8 6 By "disproportionate," critics
had in mind the five-to-six percentage target level of outlier
payments specified in the Medicare statute. Specifically, the Act
requires annual program-wide outlier payments to represent five-to-
six percent of all standard, DRG payments to all Medicare providers
in the aggregate.2 7  The target does not refer to individual
providers.28 The fact that Tenet's outlier payment percentage was
higher than the statutory five-to-six-percent range-as high as
twenty-five percent 289--misapprehends the meaning and purpose of
the statutory provision. The statutory range is a target for the
290percentage of the total Medicare budget allocated to outlier cases.
Relying on that provision to suggest that Tenet received a
"disproportionate" share of outlier payments because it received
more than six percent represents a fundamental misunderstanding
of the statute.
The outlier payment methodology does not anticipate equitable
distribution, with all providers receiving roughly proportional
shares of the limited pool of outlier dollars. It is both possible and
expected that some hospitals will receive no outlier adjustments
while other hospitals will claim a high proportion of outlier cases
relative to non-outlier, or standard DRG cases. In particular,
certain facilities, such as research-oriented teaching hospitals and
large urban trauma centers, tend to have relatively high numbers of
cases qualifying for outlier adjustments because they provide
sophisticated, resource-intensive services. 291 Those services result in
higher costs per case than cases at small, rural hospitals, or
hospitals not offering high-technology, specialty care. The tendency
of one type of hospital to receive more outlier cases than another
does not necessarily suggest improper conduct by the hospital.
286. See, e.g., Bartels, Examining, supra note 73 ("Tenet hospitals have
received an unusually large share of such extra [Medicare outlier] payments.");
Editorial, The Real Tenet Scandal, supra note 2 ("We're told that Tenet came
under regulatory scrutiny only when competitors, worried they weren't getting
their fair share of outliers, snitched."); see also CMS, INSTRUCTIONS, supra note
186.
287. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(iv) (2000).
288. Id.
289. See, e.g., White, supra note 121 (noting that Tenet's "special payments"
accounted for as much as twenty-five percent of the company's total Medicare
revenue for the previous year, compared to "average for major hospital chains
[which] has been estimated to be in the 5%-to-6% range").
290. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(iv).
291. See, e.g., Abelson, supra note, at C1 (stating that teaching hospitals and
other large hospital chains generally receive more outlier payments because of
kinds of cases they typically treat).
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Tenet facilities, in particular, had a high case mix of complex cases
because they targeted the market for specialized, high-technology
treatment 2  But the public misunderstood both the statutory
provision and the correlation between the type of treatment offered
at a particular hospital and the likelihood of outlier cases resulting.
In addition, contrary to public perceptions, Tenet's strategy of
targeting complex cases was legal and consistent with Medicare
program rules and regulations. Congress specifically authorized
payment adjustments for extraordinarily expensive cases because
policymakers recognized that certain cases, "because of severity of
illness or complicating conditions," would not be adequately
29
compensated under the DRG payment methodology. Congress
was concerned that providers might avoid treating the Medicare
program's sickest and neediest patients and approved extra
payment to correct the disincentive. Tenet's hospitals did not avoid
treating the hard cases but actively sought them out, consistent
with regulatory incentives.
Moreover, the public failed to understand the nuances of the
Medicare budget and limited outlier pool. The overall Medicare
budget is not depleted just because one hospital receives a higher
percentage of outlier cases than another hospital. Outlier payments
represent a fixed, budget-neutral item under the Medicare program.
By statute, they will not exceed six percent of the total annual
Medicare inpatient budget. 4 Even if one Medicare provider, such
as Tenet, collects a relatively high percentage of outlier payments,
there is no impact on overall Medicare program costs or depletion of
Medicare funds allocated to standard DRG payments. Inferring
wrongdoing from the fact that Tenet hospitals' outlier payments
exceeded six percent of standard DRG cases reflects the public's
fundamental misunderstanding of the controlling law and
regulatory incentives.
But in the wake of Enron, the public suddenly demanded that
CMS shift regulatory priorities without regard to the actual risks
posed by the outlier problem or secondary effects of closing the
loophole. In addition to widespread availability errors that distorted
the regulatory agenda, the public exacerbated the problem by
292. See, e.g., Carolyn Said, Bay Area Pays Dearly for Tenet, Other Hospitals
Charge About Half As Much, Data Show, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 15, 2002, at Al
(quoting Tenet spokesman Greg Harrison: "We're treating more-complex cases
or sicker patients and more of them. . . . That accounts for some of the
disparity.").
293. S. REP. No. 98-23, at 51 (1983) ("The committee amendment, therefore,
requires the Secretary to provide additional payment for cases which are
extraordinarily costly to treat, relative to other cases within the DRG.").
294. Id.
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applying informal sanctions, which inappropriately raised the
stakes for providers that had been setting prices under the outlier
loophole, with little risk over many years. Tenet adjusted its risk-
reward calculus to respond to public perceptions and informal
sanctions but, in doing so, compromised the availability of highly
demanded medical services.299  Tenet's business strategy for
innovative products provided high-quality specialty care to a
targeted sub-market of health care consumers and offered valuable
models for market-based health care delivery. Tenet's dramatic
decline in the wake of Enron demonstrates the dangers of allowing
the public to set regulatory priorities based on incomplete
information and inaccurate judgments.
C. Virtues of Bureaucracy
Regulations reflect reasoned policy decisions developed though
formal, deliberative processes. Administrative agencies are
specialists at obtaining and processing information. Institutional
structures guide the process and ensure that all relevant
information is collected and considered. Virtues, such as
rationalization, expertise, insulation, and authority are inherent in
the regulatory scheme.296 Specifically, under notice and comment
rulemaking, agencies like CMS publish proposed rules; solicit,
review, and respond to public comments by the public; assess and
report on the budgetary impact of any changes; and incorporate and
revise interested constituents' proposals before issuing a finalS 297
program regulation or amendment. In particular, CMS annually
295. See Khanna, supra note 268, at 1225 (discussing the rationale for
corporate liability standards and suggesting that for socially appropriate
amount of particular good to be produced, the price of the good should reflect its
true social costs, including potential liability).
296. See BREYER, supra note 6, at 61-63 (describing four virtues of
administrative systems and advocating a group of special civil servants to bring
uniformity and rationality to decisionmaking in highly technical areas); Kuran
& Sunstein, supra note 5, at 746-57 (advocating "comprehensive rationality"
and describing institutional safeguards against harmful cascades, including
new governmental structures to insulate civil servants from mass demands for
regulatory changes).
297. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 319, 335-
36 (2002) (describing administrative law theory justifications for legitimacy of
administrative agency rulemaking, including the requirements that agencies
stay within the bounds of statutory delegations and engage in reasoned
decisionmaking by soliciting public comments, carefully considering issues
raised, and rationally justifying policy choices) (quoting Johnathan Weinberg,
ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187, 221-22 (2000)). See
generally 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000) (Administrative Procedure Act rulemaking
provision).
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updates inpatient PPS rates, incorporating price and cost changes,
utilization patterns, treatment methods, and inflation factors.298
The agency also regularly reviews every aspect of the Medicare
payment system, updates prices for all Medicare-reimbursed
services, and considers other changes to improve program
operations, efficiency, and payment accuracy.299
Medicare authorities on several previous occasions evaluated
comments identifying various flaws in the outlier payment
methodology. Through the institutional structures of formal
rulemaking, the agency carefully considered the issues and potential
flaws in the outlier formula. Over the years, the agency accepted
some suggested changes and rejected others, each time rationally
justifying its policy decisions. The essential elements of the outlier
regulations, including reference to hospitals' actual charges and
unfettered discretion to set charges, were retained. 300 But in late
2001 and early 2002, after years of acquiescence, Medicare
authorities responded to public pressure after Enron and imposed
informal sanctions. 0 1 Regulatory priorities were set by availability
entrepreneurs, such as Kenneth Weakley, and availability cascades
that resulted from the Enron fall-out led to the public's identifying
the outlier loophole to explain Tenet's remarkable profitability,
without fully understanding the regulatory and market incentives
that drove Tenet's business strategies.
Without citing any laws or regulations that might be violated,
CMS in late 2002 announced an outlier initiative, conducted
primarily through sub-regulatory enforcement and policy setting.2
The agency issued memoranda, guidance statements, and informal
audits suggesting that providers should reduce in their charges and
otherwise adjust practices with respect to the outlier loophole.02
The agency's strategy of informal action rather than formal
rulemaking resulted in unpredictability and inefficient self-policing
by targeted providers like Tenet. In 2003, CMS eventually amended
the outlier regulations through formal rulemaking, a process that
reconciled the controlling law, justified the changes, and balanced
competing incentives. 304  The changes called for by CMS's final
298. 42 C.F.R. § 412.8(b) (2004).
299. Id. § 412.60(e).
300. See supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text (describing several
years' annual PPS updates and discussion of outlier adjustment).
301. See CMS, NOTICE, supra note 170.
302. See supra Section IV.A.3 (discussing the CMS outlier initiative).
303. See CMS, INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 186; CMS, NOTICE, supra note 170.
304. See Medicare Program; Change in Methodology for Determining
Payment for Extraordinarily High-Cost Cases (Cost Outliers) Under Acute Care
Hospital Inpatient and Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment
[Vol. 401280
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outlier regulations were far less radical than the response the public
demanded through informal sanctions.0 5
Unfortunately, by the time formal regulations were issued,
Tenet had already reacted to public pressure and adjusted its
business practices to comply with emerging corporate norms
favoring fairness and self-restraint over aggressive competition and
profit-maximization. The changes Tenet implemented compromised
the company's strong market position. Tenet executives who had
been most closely identified with the outlier issue were removed,
without regard to their overall contributions and talents, apart from
Medicare reimbursement strategies." 6 The company appointed new
officers and board members, including a physician and a former
auditor, with expertise suggesting renewed commitment to
professionalism and accountability.307 Tenet preemptively adopted a
revised approach to calculating its own Medicare outlier claims,
resulting in a substantial payment reduction, even though CMS had
not yet implemented any changes to the payment formula.38 The
company also changed its pricing and debt-collection policies for
charges incurred by uninsured and underinsured patients. 30 9 All of
those changes reflected contrition more than rational business
decisions. 310  Tenet's self-corrective policies caused a dramatic,
persistent decline in share value.31' As it turned out, many of the
changes would not have been required under the final outlier
amendments.
The formal amendments narrowed but did not entirely close the
loophole. In particular, CMS declined any changes to the rules
regarding hospital charges or the fixed outlier pool.312 The agency's
Systems; Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 34,494, 34,496 (June 9, 2003) (to be codified
at 42 C.F.R. pt. 412).
305. See supra notes 193-97 (describing final outlier amendments).
306. Debora Vrana & Ronald D. White, Tenet Names Kangas as Chairman,
L.A. TIMES, July 23, 2003, at Cl; Ronald D. White, Tenet's Top Legal Counsel
Resigns, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2003, at C1.
307. Andrew Pollack, Tenet Vows Improvements in Patient Care, N.Y. TIMES,
July 24, 2003, at C5; Vrana & White, supra note 307.
308. Pasztor, supra note 120, at B7.
309. Lisa Girion, Tenet Set to Discount Charges to Uninsured, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 2004, at C1.
310. See Pasztor, supra note 173, at B7 (quoting an analyst's observation
that Tenet officials are "trying to show they are good public citizens"); White,
supra note 290, at 2D (indicating that Administrator Scully was "pleasantly
surprised" by Tenet's actions and said that the company took a "pretty
honorable step").
311. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (detailing Tenet's market
decline).
312. See Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Outpatient Prospective
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restraint respects the government's limited authority under the
Medicare statute as well as the competing regulatory and private
incentives driving health care markets. The amendments instead
focused on problems associated with RCC lag time and statewide
average RCC. Specifically, the regulations authorized FIs to use
updated but non-final cost report data to reduce RCC lag-time and
eliminated reversion to the statewide RCC for hospital-specific
RCCs falling below the established parameters. 13
Separately, the agency issued statements affirming the
understanding that Medicare LCC, cost apportionment, and other
regulations do not "require" hospitals to charge and collect full list
prices from indigent patients. 14 Offering discounts or sliding-scale
rates based on ability to pay is fully consistent with Medicare policy,
according to CMS. Nevertheless, CMS did not impose Medicare
price controls or cap the level of Medicare outlier payments that a
particular hospital could claim. Those regulations, if implemented,
would not only violate CMS's noninterference policy but also impair
hospitals' ability to negotiate competitive prices in the private
market and develop specialized, targeted health care services. Post-
Enron public perceptions frowned on profitability and favored self-
restraint. But agency regulations retained a measured view of
health care markets and did not trample efficient profit-
maximization incentives. Hospitals remain free to establish charges
based on what the market will bear. The recently enacted MMA,
which includes the most significant changes to Medicare since the
program's inception, affirms the traditional noninterference policy
on health care pricing.3" That MMA provision, like the outlier
loophole, has attracted considerable criticism as naked rent-seeking
by pharmaceutical and insurance industries.316 The criticism may be
Payment System and Calendar Year 2004 Payment Rates, 68 Fed. Reg. 63,398,
63,460 (Nov. 7, 2003) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 410, 419).
313. See supra notes 193-97 and accompanying text (summarizing changes
to outlier payment methodology).
314. See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text (describing the Medicare
Part D prescription drug benefit).
316. See supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text (discussing the MMA's
noninterference provision); see also DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW'S ORDER 33 (2000)
(noting that the "term [rent-seeking] was coined to describe competition for
government favors"); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 41 n.3
(5th ed. 1998) ("The tendency of an expected gain to be translated into costs
through competitive efforts is called rent-seeking. . . ."); MAXWELL L. STEARNS,
PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY 120-24 (1997)
(describing the interest group theory of rent seeking); James M. Buchanan,
Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING
SOCIETY 4 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980) ("The term rent seeking is
1282 [Vol. 40
HeinOnline  -- 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1282 2005
GAUGING THE COST OF LOOPHOLES
warranted, but any changes to the policy should be conducted
through rational bureaucratic processes, shielded from public
emotions and judgment errors.
The proliferation of corporate wrongdoing and accounting
scandals beginning with Enron in late 2001, drove the public to
identify Tenet's high prices and debt collection practices as "unfair"
or cheating under an identifiable Medicare loophole. Without fully
considering the costs of its informal enforcement campaign, the
public imposed sanctions and pressured hospitals to dramatically
alter practices that previously drew tacit approval or even praise.
By contrast, CMS comprehensively evaluated the various competing
regulatory and market incentives underlying hospital prices,
product and service differentiation, patient mix, and other factors
influencing the level of outlier cases that a particular hospital
receives. The Medicare program is notoriously complex, and the
outlier adjustment is just one small strand in an intricate web. The
formal administrative rulemaking process that eventually occurred
allowed the agency to assess the impact of tugging on one strand of
the Medicare web on the overall health care system. That formal
approach to closing Medicare loopholes is preferable to the
availability cascade and informal reactions to Tenet and the outlier
issue.
Perhaps closing the outlier loophole would have been the most
direct and efficient regulatory response. Eliminating the outlier
adjustment altogether removes the questionable incentive for charge
inflation. Closing the loophole would also enhance predictability for
the Medicare program and participating providers, who would
receive only the fixed DRG amount, even for extraordinarily
expensive cases. Just as Medicare authorities eliminated the day
outlier adjustment, they could eliminate the cost outlier adjustment.
Congress' concern that eliminating cost outliers would result in
hospitals avoiding the hard cases would likely not occur because the
system contains other payment adjustments and enforcement
mechanisms to check that incentive. First, outlier cases tend to
occur with greater frequency at teaching hospitals, urban hospitals
that treat a disproportionate share of underinsured patients, and
sophisticated trauma centers, facilities that already receive
Medicare adjustments to make up for their added costs. 317 Also,
designed to describe behavior in institutional settings where individual efforts
to maximize value generate social waste rather than social surplus."); Robert D.
Tollison, Rent Seeking, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND
THE LAW 315 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) ("Rent seeking is the socially costly
pursuit of wealth transfers ....").
317. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.105 (2004) (regarding special payment for hospitals
20051 1283
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regulators update the average DRG payment amounts annually,S318
using hospitals' actual cost and charge data, meaning that the
increased costs of treating particular cases or types of cases
eventually become incorporated as average rather than
extraordinary reimbursement levels. Moreover, regulators have
discretion to create new DRGs and could do so to provide additional
payment for certain categories of high-cost cases. Finally,
regulatory quality-of-care standards31 9 and common law tort
liability,32° to some extent, already police the incentive to avoid or
under-serve needy patients.
Medicare authorities may have opted to narrow but not close
the loophole because closing it would require statutory
amendment, 32' a typically slower, more cumbersome process than
revising regulations. Or the agency may have determined that the
extra payment continues to be a necessary incentive to avoid
treating the hard cases. As CMS continues to monitor the outlier
issue and assess regulatory priorities and incentives, authorities
may determine that the burdens of pursuing statutory amendment
are worth the benefits of increased predictability and reduced
program costs. Formal institutions, administrative expertise, inter-
that incur indirect costs of graduate medical education), id. § 412.106(d)
(regulations regarding special payment for hospitals that treat disproportionate
share of low-income patients). In particular:
The indirect medical education adjustment recognizes that there are
additional costs that teaching hospitals incur in connection with the
presence of graduate medical education programs. Congress was
concerned that teaching hospitals might be adversely affected by the
implementation of [PPS] because these hidden costs would not be
reflected in [PPS] payment rates as costs were standardized and the
system moved toward a national payment rate applicable to all
hospitals.
Medicare Program; Changes to the Inpatient Hospital Prospective Payment
System and Fiscal Year 1986 Rates, 50 Fed. Reg. 35,646, 35,681 (Sept. 3, 1985)
(codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 412).
318. See supra notes 299-300 and accompanying text (describing annual
inpatient PPS updates).
319. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 424.13 (listing inpatient hospital Medicare
conditions of participation), id. § 424.5(a)(ii) (excluding from coverage "services
not reasonable and necessary").
320. Under the common law, hospitals may be held liable for an individual
physicians' failure to provide adequate or appropriate medical treatment or
other medical malpractice. See, e.g., Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska
1987) (describing theories of hospitals' vicarious liability, including enterprise
liability, apparent authority, and non-delegable duty); Darling v. Charleston
Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 257 (Ill. 1965) (describing hospitals'
independent duty to monitor physicians).
321. The Medicare outlier adjustment is found in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(i) (2000).
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branch coordination, other processes insulated from public
misperceptions and judgment errors will allow lawmakers to
address Medicare loopholes through measured, deliberative analysis
of relevant risks.322
VI. CONCLUSION
In complex regulatory programs like Medicare, loopholes are
inevitable. Regulators may lack the resources to keep up and to
quickly and tightly close loopholes as they become apparent. But
without the risk of sanctions, the potential rewards for exploiting
loopholes increase. Accordingly, among rational actors, we can
predict that the incidence of questionable conduct also will increase.
Therefore, public pressure and informal sanctions could potentially
enhance formal regulations. In the aftermath of Enron, however,
the public latched on to the Medicare outlier loophole as yet another
readily available example of corporate fraud and "creative
accounting" without fully understanding the complex interplay of
private market and regulatory incentives for health care. Public
perceptions created an availability cascade, focused on the outlier
loophole as the key problem needing to be addressed. The cascade of
blame led to informal sanctions. Tenet and other targeted health
care providers internalized the sanctions and dismantled promising
models for private market health care delivery. The chain reaction
eventually pressured regulators to respond with investigations,
enforcement initiative, and hastily implemented reforms.
In that climate, health care providers could not rationally
evaluate the risks of engaging in certain conduct and adjust
practices to conform, short of ceasing altogether or drastically
overhauling core strategies and operations. The unfortunate result
of the post-Enron health care public reactions and administrative
reforms was the dismantling of a promising private market model
for health care delivery. Health care pricing and third-party
reimbursement is a highly technical web of incentives that requires
a coordinated agency response. Moreover, the current trend in
health care reform emphasizes privatization and market
competition to increase efficiency and reduce health care costs.
Those measures are doomed if widespread judgment errors, based
on the latest news report of Wall Street executives gone bad and
322. See BREYER, supra note 6, at 61-63 (describing the "virtues of
bureaucracy"); Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 746-59 (discussing
institutional safeguards against harmful cascades). See generally Sunstein,
supra note 6, at 934 (advocating cost-benefit analysis to correct cognitive errors,
including availability cascades). Cf. Abramowicz, supra note 5 (analyzing
whether informational markets could improve agency decisionmaking).
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incomplete understanding of the complex health care system, are
allowed to drive regulatory responses. Instead, agencies should be
insulated from public pressures and given the space to develop and
deliberate over rational policies for policing loopholes, while
carefully assessing the risks of privatizing or market-based
strategies to improve the nation's health care system.
HeinOnline  -- 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1286 2005
